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Abstract
The objective of this thesis is to investigate the consequences of corruption for the duration
of political regimes during the time period 1984-2008. I derive hypotheses following the
extension of the “selectorate theory” (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003, chap.8) developed
to investigate the situations causing threats to the institutional framework (the political
regime). The welfare of societal groups and institutional preferences in light of private
and public goods allocation are the main determinants of regime stability. Corruption is
one of several factors that affect the welfare of societal groups through the allocation of
private goods.
As a first step, a series of logistic regression models evaluate the relationship between
corruption, political regimes and events linked to political instability and civil unrest.
Corruption increases the likelihood of experiencing coup attempts, government crisis,
revolution attempt, and demonstrations in the period 1984-2008. In relation to the main
analyses, these events are intervening factors that under certain circumstances may lead
to a change in the political regime of a country. Therefore, I test how the duration of
political regimes are affected by corruption conditioned on political regimes. The main
results extend “Model 2 1900-2000” in Gates et al. (2006, p.901), which find that institu-
tionally consistent regimes (democracies and autocracies) endure longer than inconsistent
regimes, by including an interaction term between corruption and political regimes. I hy-
pothesize that corruption decreases the stability of democracies and increase the stability
of autocracies, and thereby evaluate further the implications of de facto political power
(defined as the sum of factors affecting the distribution of resources) on the duration of
political regimes.
The main findings of this thesis, using survival analysis, suggest that corruption only
affects the duration of democracies. This finding is consistent across model specifications
and alternative operationalizations of political regimes, but there is a high degree of
uncertainty linked to the estimates. Democracies are more durable, in the sense that
they have a lower probability of regime change when corruption is low. An increase in
corruption decreases the survival ratio of democratic regimes. The level of corruption
does not affect the duration of autocratic regimes, nor are autocratic regimes more stable
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Does corruption affect the duration of political regimes? With this research question I
aim to analyze how the allocation of de facto political power affects the duration of po-
litical regimes. Gates et al. (2006, p.901) find that ideal types such as democracies and
autocracies last longer than political regimes that are inconsistent (e.g. neither demo-
cratic nor autocratic). Their findings are part of an extensive literature (e.g. Gates et al.
(2006), Gurr (1974), Przeworski et al. (2000) and Sanhueza (1999)) that evaluate how
the duration of political regimes are affected by their internal properties and conditions
such as economic development, type of resources and political institutions. Few quanti-
tative contributions, exceptions being Hegre and Fjelde (2011) and Arriola (2009), look
into the informal properties of a political regime; corruption and other factors measuring
the quality of institutions have not been sufficiently investigated. Examining the infor-
mal properties gives us insight into how properties of de facto political power affect the
duration of political regimes.
In order to analyse the effect of corruption, I start by replicating model “Model 2
1900-2000” in Gates et al. (2006, p.901) for the time period 1984 to 2008. There are
theoretical reasons to expect that the corruption and political regimes are interlinked
(see Section 2.3), meaning that the incentive to act on corruption, and the consequences
of corruption for institutional duration depends on the initial political regime. Different
political regimes, with different institutional frameworks, provide different opportunities
and constraints on the possibility of corruption, and as a result the consequences of
corruption on institutional duration must be conditioned on political regimes. Other
studies have analysed similar research question, but with use of different research method
(Hegre and Fjelde, 2011); the ones on institutional stability that have used survival
analysis have not evaluated the effect of corruption. In sum, the reciprocal relationship
between corruption, political regimes and the duration of political regimes have not before
been analysed with survival analysis.
Explanatory factors. Figure 1.1 place corruption among some of the other main
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determinants of the duration of political regimes in the literature (see e.g. Acemoglu
and Robinson (2006), Epstein et al. (2006), Gates et al. (2006), Gurr (1974), Hegre and
Fjelde (2011), Przeworski et al. (1996), Przeworski et al. (2000), Sanhueza (1999)), where
a political regime in t is a measurement based on the three conceptual dimensions used
in Gates et al. (2006, p.896): political participation, executive constraint and executive
recruitment. In sum, the indicators of de jure distribution of political power. Corruption,
inequality, income, economic growth and the nature of resources (e.g. natural resources)
influence the distribution of resources between groups in society. In turn, these factors
influence the level de facto political power between groups which is a function of the
present allocation of resources within a political regime, and between societal groups.
In total, de jure- and de facto political power equals the political power of any societal
group. Political regimes are therefore distinguished in terms of which group hold the
most political power at any given point. In democracies, political power is more evenly
spread across groups and citizens, but can be skewed given the distribution of resources
and the means available in attaining de facto political power. Autocracy, on the other
hand, is characterized by an uneven spread of political power; in autocratic regimes
citizen have less de jure political power through political institutions making the overall
political power, by definition, more unevenly spread across groups and citizens. Overall,
the allocation of de jure- and de facto political power between societal groups affects the
stability and duration of political regimes (political regimes in t + 1).
The effect of corruption on the duration of political regimes have two dimensions; a
strategic dimension inherent in the allocation of political power between groups (i.e. cor-
ruption as a strategic instrument), and a structural dimension where corruption affects
the duration of political regimes through other factors such as economic development
and growth. The object of this thesis is to explain how different constellations, or mix
of allocations between those with and without de jure and de facto political power, can
sustain over time. Corruption is therefore an indicator of the “quality” or “efficiency” of
governmental structures, and how institutional structures favor certain societal groups.
Economic growth, democracy and lack of corruption, are closely tied to the concept of
efficiency and quality, and are considered to create incentives for public goods and public
citizenship. Letki (2006, p.309-310) state that “high level of state capture (demonstrated
by corruption and clientelism) make contributions to the public good a non-rational and
gullible strategy”. However, as the consequences of corruption depends on the initial
political regime, I try to evaluate the allocation of goods as a strategy that affects the du-
ration of political regimes if incompatible with the incentive structure of a given political
regime.
Main argument. Using the selectorate theory as main theoretical source (Bueno
3Participation










Figure 1.1: The domestic factors affecting regime duration; a simplified visualization of
the main sub indicators of de jure and de facto political power as determinants of the
future political regime
de Mesquita et al., 2003, chap.8), I hypothesize that the effect of corruption depends
on political regimes. Furthermore, I hypothesize that corruption decreases the duration
of democracies and increases the duration of autocracies. The selectorate theory offers a
comprehensive overview of how allocation of resources, institutional preferences and initial
political regime affects the welfare of societal groups and the stability of the stability of
the current political regime. The welfare of societal groups is affected by the allocation
of public and private goods. Corruption as an indicator of private goods allocation thus
affects the duration of political regimes in cases where private goods are incompatible with
the incentives structure of the regime. In democracies, political survival and depends
on the lederships ability to allocate public goods. In autocracies, private goods such
as corruption are used as a source of political support. As an increase in corruption
simultaneously means a decrease in the overall level of public goods, corruption directly
affects the welfare of societal groups. Political regimes are expected to be less stable if
resources are not allocated stregically in accordance with the preferences of the societal
groups sustaining the current leadership and political regime.
Several events may lead to a change in the political regime. Following the predic-
tions derived from the selectorate theory I expect corruption to increase the likelihood of
events of political instability and civil unrest. Specifically, I hypothesize that corruption
increases the chances of coups, riots, demonstrations and government crisis. I include the
test of these particular events in order to motivate the theoretical assumption concern-
ing the duration of political regimes. While corruption is expected to increase political
instability and civil unrest, the available counteractions differ between political regimes.
In other words, corruption is simultaneously an instrument that increases the welfare of
the supporters of the regime in autocratic regimes. In sum, political instability and civil
unrest does not necessarily mean that the political regime will fail, but indicates some
intervening consequences of corruption.
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Main findings. The empirical analyses are presented in two turns. First I analyze the
relationship between corruption and coup attempts, government crisis, riots, revolutions
and demonstrations. These analyses investigate the relationship between corruption and
political instability and civil unrest. I find that corruption significantly increases the
likelihood of all events except riots. Furthermore, analyses that include interaction terms
between regime types and corruption are either not significant or point in the direction
of the general trend (more corruption increases instability and unrest). In other words,
regardless of political regime, corruption increases the likelihood of political instability
and civil unrest.
The relationship between corruption and the destabilizing events are linked to the
duration of political regimes in a preliminary fashion. Democracies and autocracies are
not equally sensitive to corruption as the incentive structure of the latter encourages
corruption as a form of private goods. In other words, even though corruption increases
instability and unrest in autocracies it simultaneously increases the political support of
the leadership. In addition, the oppressive and repressive strategies available in autocratic
regimes make them more robust to political instability and civil unrest.
When modeling the duration of political regimes directly, I find that corruption de-
creases the likelihood of survival in democracies. This finding is robust to alternative
model specifications and operationalizations. In autocracies, on the other hand, I find no
interaction effect between corruption and political regimes. Not under any model speci-
fications or operationalizations are there any conditional effect between political regime
and corruption on the stability of political regimes.
Chapter 2
Literature review and theoretical
framework
This chapter consists of three main parts; first I summarize, narrow down and pinpoint
a definition of corruption and political regimes. Second, I turn to give a broad overview
of the factors that affect the duration of political regimes by summarizing the relevant
literature on the topic. Two aspects of corruption are particularly interesting; corruption
as a strategic instrument to gain political support, and the structural consequences of
corruption (e.g. the effect on economic development). Third, I turn to the theoretical
framework used to understand the role and consequences of corruption for the duration
of political regimes. The framework applied is mainly influenced by the “selectorate the-
ory” presented in Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003, chap.8). While the main explanatory
force of the selectorate theory concerns domestic political survival (e.g. length of political
tenure), three articles extend the framework to include institutional change and duration:
the formal properties are explained in “Political Survival and Endogenous Institutional
Change” (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, 2009) and “The Perils of Unearned Income”
(Smith, 2008) while “Leader Survival, Revolutions, and the Nature of Government Fi-
nance” (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, 2010) is an empirical evaluation of the topic. At
the end of this chapter I summarize the main expectations and derive hypotheses.
2.1 Conceptual definitions
In order to build a bridge between the concept of the core variables corruption, political
regimes and the duration of political regimes, and the measures used to operationalize
and analyze the relationships between these concepts (see Section 3.2), I start by defining
corruption conceptually according to the existing literature. I am interested in the link
between background- and systematized concepts, and the ability of the indicators used
5
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to measure exactly that (Adcock and Collier, 2001, p.531). Quite naturally, there is
sometimes hard to find good measurements and data; this is to some extent true for the
corruption index used in this thesis. One remedy is therefore a thorough introduction of
the concept, and an evaluation of the measurements used in order to narrow down the
scope and interpretation of the results to fit the choice of measurement. Consider this
section an introduction to the concepts behind the data used in the statistical models,
and therefore part of a discussion of the measurement validity (i.e. “the systematic error
that arises when the links among systematized concepts, indicators, and scores are poorly
developed”) (Adcock and Collier, 2001, p.532).
2.1.1 Corruption
The usual starting point for studies of corruption, especially cross-national ones, is to
define corruption as “the abuse of public power and influence for private ends” (Gardiner,
2008, p.25). Shleifer and Vishny (1993, p.1) introduce the concept of government cor-
ruption as “the sale by government officials of government property for personal gain”,
focusing on the actions of public agents in granting privileges, collecting bribes and utiliz-
ing their public position for private benefits. The diversity between the types and modes
of corruption makes the conceptual delimitation challenging. The main problem is that
corruption tend to be defined and perceived differently across the world Gardiner (2008,
p.25).
First of all, in order to narrow down the scope of the term corruption, the main focus in
this thesis is governmental corruption, but at the same time I follow Rothstein and Teorell
(2008, p.69) in including “clientilism, nepotism, cronyism, patronage, discrimination, and
cases where administrative agencies are“captured”by the interest groups that they are set
out to regulate and control,...”. Therefore, to specify, I consider only the consequences of
governmental corruption, i.e. corruption where agents with political power are involved,
to influence the prospect of political regime endurance. This choice is off course shaped
by the available data material, where the corruption index used in this thesis measure the
concept mentioned above such as patronage and nepotism. The type of corruption “that
can lead to popular discontent, unrealistic and inefficient controls on the state economy,
and encourage the development of the black market” (PRS Group, 2012)
In an analysis of the link between corruption, inequality and the rule of law in among
other countries Romania, Uslaner (2008, p.133) find that “[w]henever corruption shapes
people’s evaluation of their state or their society, it is high-level corruption”. It is exactly
this effect of corruption, and this form of corruption that is the main inquiry of my the-
sis. It is high-level corruption among agents with political power that have the potential
to affect the stability of the institutional framework by triggering destabilizing events
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of political instability and civil unrest. To further quote Uslaner (2008, p.133): “The
misdeeds of ordinary professionals don’t matter”. Given the magnitude of changing the
political regime, the actions necessarily in catalyzing such events is likely to be rooted
in widespread and systemic corruption rather than low-level corruption. Furthermore,
high-level corruption is the form of corruption that is most closely intervened with the
distribution of resources and therefore also de facto political power. Such forms of cor-
ruption will favor the leadership and the political elite, and create discomfort and unrest
among the citizenry that potentially can lead to events shaping the future political regime
(PRS Group, 2012, p.4-5).
Corruption is not merely the extraction of public monetary goods for private gains.
Corruption also reflects the relationship between agents with political power, and the
agents granting them with political support. A related concepts is the distribution of
position and services, or the threat of removing such priviliges, in exchange for past and
future political support (“clientelism” (Boix and Stokes, 2009, p.2-4)), and sub concepts
such as patronage (exchange of public resources for political support by government of-
ficials) and vote buying (exchange of goods for votes) (Boix and Stokes, 2009, p.4-5).
Clientelism, patronage and vote buying are thereby defined according to the relationship
and position between actors. Clientelism, like corruption in general, is about position, po-
litical influence and survival: “[t]hose in control–patrons, subpatrons, and brokers–provide
selective access to goods and opportunities and place themselves or their supporters in
position from which they can divert resources and services in their favor” (Roniger, 2004,
p.354). The main focus here is how these forms of “misuse” grant the buyer and seller
with a advantage that they would not otherwise had if the formal rules of conduct had
been followed. Party founding is therefore also included in the definition, and measured
by the “International Country Risk Guide“ as “suspiciously close ties between politics and
business” (PRS Group, 2012, p.4-5).
The multitude of related concepts included in the definition of corruption means that
corruption-indices compare cumulative events that vary extensively. Events such as when
the information minister of Sierra Leone sold the national television transmitter in 1987,
Robert Mugabe won the national lottery while governing Zimbabwe in 2000 and 50 per-
cent of municipals budgets in east Colombia are directly transferred to the paramili-
tary group “Paramilitary Peasants of Casanare” (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012, p.372-
373,381); national parties in Romania started an investment program in 1992 promising
800 percent returns before collapsing two years later in 1994 and loosing the savings of
a large amount of Romanians (Uslaner, 2008, p.127); lower level officials in Ukraine are
threatened and blackmailed to aid and secure votes in favor of President Leonid Kuchma’s
reelection in the 1999 presidential election (Darden, 2008, p.49-50); or the Philippine Pres-
ident Ferdinand Marcos makes the “Guinness Book of Record 1999” for largest theft ever
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committed ($ 860.8 million in 1986) (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003, p.167) are all acts
labelled corruption. It also means that terms such as “extraction institutions” (Acemoglu
and Robinson, 2012) or the distinction between corruption as a behavioral pattern and
as an informal institution are not differentiated (Helmke and Levitsky, 2004). In other
words, the different aspects, modes and types of corruption are not distinguishable, but
simplified as an indicator of the misuse of public goods for private gains.
Common sources. Mainly three sources are used in cross-national analysis of cor-
ruption (Treisman, 2007); “International Country Risk Guide”, World Bank (WB), and
Transparency International (TI). The corruption index from ICRG used in this thesis,
the“Corruption Perceptions Index” (CPI) from TI, and the“Control of Corruption” index
by the WB. The ICRG corruption index and the CPI corruption index are measurements
of perceived corruption. In other words, they aggregate different sources such as risk
ratings, surveys and polls to create a measurement of corruption. The WB corruption
index, on the other hand, measure
Even though they are constructed differently there is a strong correlation between
the corruption indices which indicates that they to some degree capture the main trends
similarly (Treisman, 2007, p.214). For example, perceived corruption and experienced
corruption tend to be correlated; Treisman (2007, p.217-219) report correlations in the
range of 0.6 and 0.8 between common sources of corruption data such as the TI and
World Bank index on the other, but the results are mixed depending on the survey and
the formulation of the questions used. Olken (2009, p.26) also report a positive, but weak
correlation between perceived and experienced corruption.
The correlation results do not hold up when using more sophisticated methods; Donchev
and Ujhelyi (2009, p.2) report, in a comparison of the three corruption indices mentioned
above and actual experience with corruption, that “..., corruption experience is found to
be a weak and in most cases statistically insignificant determinant of all three corrup-
tion perception indices”. Even though concluding optimistically about the evolution and
future prospect of corruption indices, Urra (2007, p.8-9) conclude that the challenge of
“obtaining simple and complete reliable indicators is impossible by the very nature of cor-
ruption”. The task is challenging, especially in attaining cross-national time-series data
enabling reliable analysis of both the determinants- and consequences of corruption. Due
to the conflicting time series of the different corrupiton indices, it is not possible to use
alternative measures in order to test the robustness of the results derived in this thesis.
This is a weakness that highlights the need for consistent time series data on corruption
and related concepts.
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2.1.2 Political regimes
I distinguish between autocratic, democratic and inconsistent regimes following the op-
erationalization of Gates et al. (2006) which use several indicators from the Polity IV
project (Marshall, Jaggers and Gurr, 2010) in order to distinguish between these three
ideal types. A change in political regime can mean a change between two ideal types
(e.g. a transition from democracy to autocracy) or a change within an ideal type (e.g.
democratization of a democracy).1 Even though the conceptualization applied in these
two indices are widely used, I find it beneficial for the remainder of the thesis to elaborate
on the conceptualization across and within political regimes since there are no universal
definition in the existing literature. First of all, I view political regimes as aggregated
ideal types based on several formal institutional indicators granting agents with de jure
political power over the allocation of resources. This distinction is important as one could
easily define political regimes as an interlinked measurement of formal and informal insti-
tutions. Snyder and Mahoney (1999, p.103) does just that when arguing that “[r]egimes
are the formal and informal institutions that structure political interaction, and a change
of regime occurs when actors reconfigure these institutions”. I modify this definition by
distinguishing informal institutions from the definition of a political regimes, and add
that the interaction between formal institutions and behavioral patterns reconfigure or
sustain political regimes. By using institutions as a measurement of political regimes,
leaving informal patterns aside, I tend towards a minimalist definition of regime types.
I consider the substantial dimensions (i.e. the outcome regimes produce) as something
distinctively different from the core definition of political regimes, or more precisely, the
effect of political regimes rather than a composite part of the definition in itself.
At the core of the defining different political regimes is the distinction between democ-
racies and non democracies, and the ongoing debate concerning the utility, and precision,
of graded measurements of democracy (Coppedge et al., 2011, p.247-248 Elkins 2000,
p.293-294; ; Treier and Jackman 2008, p.213-214). Beetham (1999, p.5) define democ-
racy by highlighting two properties that universally distinguish democracies from other
political regimes: (1) popular control, (2) political equality. The main insight from this
definition of a democratic political regime is the fact that it can be applied to a large
number of different institutional varieties while at the same time capture overall “essence”
of the system. The definition follows Dahl (1971, p.1-2) when he writes that “I assume
the key characteristic of a democracy is the continuing responsiveness of the government
to the preferences of its citizens, considered as equals”. The second property, popular
control, or participation, have influences the gathering of data and indicators. Vanhanen
1The actual measurements and degrees of changes in the institutions (sub components of regimes)
necessary to change a political regime are discussed further in Section 3.2
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(2000, p.251-252), in his “Polyarchy” dataset named after the already referenced book by
Dahl (1971), gathers data and consider democracy as the sum of participation and com-
petition, and formally defining democracy as “a political system in which ideologically
and socially different groups are legally entitled to compete for political power, and in
which institutional power-holders are elected by the people and are responsible to the
people”.
Two arguments are used in favor of defining political regimes according to formal
properties: first, I find it easier to isolate and the effect of distinct phenomenon keeping
them separated as opposed to including a large amount of behavioral patterns into the
definition of political regimes, second, since the distinction between informal institutions
and behavioral patterns vary across time and space an inclusive measure that account for
both might end up confusing actions with institutions.
2.2 Literature review
I organize this literature review according to distinction between de jure- and de facto
political power presented in the introdution. The literature review is therefore centered
on the factors that influence the level of formal political power (institutions) and infor-
mal political power (income, growth resources, allocation, corruption etc.). I consider
the factors that influence a regime transition to be distinctly different from the factors
influencing the stability of political regimes (Shin, 1994, p.151; Przeworski 1997)
The literature on regime duration and institutional stability have not explicitly in-
corporated and analyzed the effect of political corruption. One of few exceptions, Hegre
and Fjelde (2011), analyze the effect of corruption on the probability of regime transition
and stability. I aim to do something similar, but with a different statistical method and
model that better capture trends in regime stability. The literature on regime transition
and regime survival highlight the fact that these to processes are different; the factors
explaining transition and stability are different and, especially the factors explaining tran-
sitions, vary over time and space (Shin, 1994, p.151). A specialized model that analyzes
duration spells is therefore, in addition to the conceptual distinction between transition
and stability, a more efficient use of the data.
2.2.1 Formal (de jure) political power: political institutions
Several studies of institutional stability view stability and duration as an equilibrium
between those with and without formal political power (Gates et al., 2006; Hegre and
Fjelde, 2011; Przeworski et al., 2000; Przeworski, 2005). Gates et al. (2006, p.894-896)
describe the equilibrium as the consistent relationship between three dimensions: (1)
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executive recruitment, (2) executive constraints, (3) and participation. Their conceptual
framework is based on the assumption that the executive is interested in maximizing
current and future power and authority. In consistent regimes, one can expect institutions
to be mutually reinforcing which in turn affects the duration of regimes. Gates et al.
(2006, p.901) confirms that consistent regimes are in fact more stable than inconsistent
regimes; democracies and autocracies tend to survive longer than inconsistent regimes in
the period 1900-2000.
Several scholars have evaluated the baseline hazard function of political regimes (the
risk of regime transition when all covariates are zero), and there seem to be some dis-
agreement (Gates2006;Gurr 1974; Przeworski et al. 1996; Przeworski et al. 2000; Sanhueza
1999). Przeworski et al. (1996, p.177-178) find no support of “consolidation” of democ-
racies; democracies are, after controlling for level of development, “about equally likely
to die at any age”. Przeworski et al. (2000, p.139-141) confirms this, and finds that the
hazard rates of dictatorships decreases slightly over time. This stand in contrast to the
findings of Sanhueza (1999, p.355) which find that the risk of regime transition increases
during the first and then stabilizes; after the initial period of increased risk stabilize and
the “duration breeds stability”. This is also the foundation for the survival model of
institutional stability in Gates et al. (2006, p.898-899)
Hegre and Fjelde (2011, p.6-11) suggest that corruption creates informal institutions
that can influence stability. Together with formal institutions informal ones can reinforce
or weaken the equilibrium of institutional stability suggested in Gates et al. (2006). In
autocratic regimes political corruption can be stabilizing. Since political corruption will
benefit the incumbent, it will be stabilizing through the monopolization of power of
the incumbent. By sharing resources with some necessary section of society, the elite,
corruption and the illegitimate distribution of public resources into private hands is likely
to consolidate the regime by widening the gap between the incumbent and the political
opponents. Hence, political corruption can be viewed as a stabilizing mechanism in
autocratic regimes. Even though an autocratic regime is not in best interest of the
citizenry, this group lack formal and informal political power and coordination problems
arise when organizing collective action. This stands as a critical barrier for institutional
change in autocratic regimes (Hegre and Fjelde, 2011, 9).
In semi-democratic regimes corruption can prolong and slow down institutional change.
The institutional structure grants an incumbent with de jure power while the institutions
for control are weak. This enables incumbents to attain de facto power through infor-
mal institutions such as corruption. In terms of incentives, the mix of access to formal
and informal power makes semi-democratic regimes more stable by limiting the benefits
achieved by institutional change toward both democratic and authoritative regimes. The
same is not the case in democratic regimes; the incentive structure in democratic regimes
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does not stimulate political corruption. This is due to the fact that institutions and non-
governmental organizations are better able to check, evaluate and control for corruption
in democratic regimes. (Hegre and Fjelde, 2011, p.9-11)
Institutional diffusion. There are several studies that find a relationship between
political neighborhood and domestic political regime; Gates et al. (2006, p.901) find that
regimes surrounded by distinctly different political regimes are more likely to experi-
ence a regime transition than ones that are not. These effects suggest that the political
conditions in neighboring countries also affect the domestic conditions of that country
(Gleditsch and Ward, 2006, p.916). The “third wave” of democratization starting in the
1970s have received much attention in the literature (Huntington, 1991, 13-26). Even
though all transitions to democracy does not sustain over time, the main notion is that
the events occurring in one country can influence the events in another. The democra-
tization of eastern Europe in the early 1990’s after the fall of the Soviet Union, and the
extensive number of regime transitions in Latin America during the 1970s (Huntington,
1991, 22), are well-suited examples of interlinked occurrences of transitional events and
regime instability. For the analysis in this thesis, this literature suggest and support the
notion that the political conditions and transitional trends can have a influence across
borders, meaning that the duration of political regimes in one country can be shortened
by popular discontent, revolutions, reform and other events occurring in close proximity
to the given political regime.
Also Doorenspleet (2004, p.317-318, 327-328) find evidence in support a diffusion
effect on the likelihood of democratic transitions, and point to the experiences in Eastern
Europe after the fall of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Instability
in neighboring countries is likely to affect domestic conditions, where transitions in one
country can influence the transitions in other countries by serving “as models for later
transitions in other countries within the same region” (Shin, 1994, p.153).
2.2.2 Informal (de facto) political power: allocation of resources
Income and growth. Przeworski et al. (1996, p.169-171) report evidence that the ef-
fect of economic development stabilizes democracies. The higher the level of economic
development the more likely democracies are to sustain over time. Also, the factors
increasing the probability of a regime surviving are “democracy, aﬄuence, growth with
moderate inflation, declining inequality, a favorable international climate, and parliamen-
tary institutions” (ibid. p.167). Also Sanhueza (1999, p.354) find support that economic
development foster political stability in democracies; the same is not true for autocracies
where the main determinant of institutional stability where found to be popular unrest
and discontent. Przeworski et al. (2000, p.122-123) find that economic development and
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growth affect the stability of both democratic- and autocratic regimes, but the magni-
tude of the effect is greater for democracies. The overall effect of economic growth on
political regime stability is confirmed by Gates et al. (2006, p.901) which find that the
level of GDP per capita increases the expected survival of political regimes in the period
1900-2000.
Przeworski (1997, p.167) argues in favor of the positive effect of economic growth on
the stability of political regimes2. The relationship between the economical situation and
the stability of political regimes are summarized accordingly: “What destabilizes regimes
are economic crisis, and democracies, particularly poor democracies, are extremely vulner-
able to bad economic performance” (Przeworski, 1997, p.169). The relationship between
income and duration is most apparent in democracies; Przeworski (2005, 253-255) report
that no democracy with a higher income per capita than Argentina in 1975 ($6055) have
ever failed. Furthermore, the effect, in terms of estimated life-span seems to be monoton-
ically increasing according with higher income per capita. In other words, an analysis of
political stability must account and control for the effect of the economy. Also important
in Przeworski (2005, 265) is the effect of economic crisis; the growth rate in itself is not
the important factor, it is the effect on income distribution of economic crisis (in close
proximity to the survival threshold) that will manifest itself on the estimated survival of
democracies.
Corruption. When evaluating the literature on the theoretical and empirical prop-
erties of corruption, most contributions analyze corruption as either a factor affecting
growth and development (e.g. Mauro (1995) and Rose-Ackerman (1975)) or the quality,
efficiency and level of public spending of governments/leaders (e.g. Acemoglu, Egorov
and Sonin (2010) and Aidt (2009)). For instance, Shleifer and Vishny (1993), evalu-
ate two properties of corruption; the institutional determinants of corruption and the
negative effect of corruption on development. While the institutional determinants of
corruption and the negative effect on development seem rather agreed upon, few theorize
how corruption might affect the stability of political regimes.
Patronage and clientielism can remain a problem even though the incentive struc-
ture, the formal properties of the regime, has changed (Bratton and van de Walle, 1997,
p.245). Formal institutions structure political action. In a study of informal institutions
in transitional regimes, Grzymala-Busse (2010, p.322) write that“[i]nformal practices and
institutions are seen as promoting corruption, delaying the consolidation of democratic
institutions, and eroding emergent formal rules”. Note that corruption in this case is a be-
havioral pattern, and not an institution itself, but that linked concepts such as clientelism
and patronage are considered informal institutions. Informal institutions and corruption
2Thereby contesting the notion in the previous literature that economic growth have a destabilizing
effect on political regimes (see e.g. Olson (1963))
14 CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE AND THEORY
thereby undermine the role and effect of formal institutional framework.
The conceptual delimitation of corruption argues in favor of a broad definition of
corruption (the misuse of public goods for private gains) including sub concepts such
as patronage, cronyism, clientelism, party funding and more. The role of corruption
in relation to formal political institutions such as elections, executive recruitment and
institutional constraints is in the introduction categorized as influencing the level of de
facto political power among societal groups. I therefore argue, in a similar manner as
Helmke and Levitsky (2004, p.725-726), that corruption is a form of informal institution
that shapes the incentives behind political behavior. The notion that “...much current
literature assumes that actors’ incentives and expectations are shaped primarily, if not
exclusively, by formal rules” Helmke and Levitsky (2004, p.725-726), is indeed relevant
for the literature on the duration of political regimes. In fact it is the main objective of
this thesis. Cross-country variation in corruption, as an indicator of informal institutions
and de facto political power, shapes the incentive structure and thereby political behavior
which in sum affect the duration of political regimes: “Political actors respond to a mix
of formal and informal incentives, and in some instances informal incentives trump the
formal ones”. The second part of the previous sentence is an empirical statement that
must be tested; it is theoretically likely that informal institutions do matter for the
duration of political regimes, but this statement must, and will, be tested.
Inequality. Corruption, rent-seeking and rent appropriation, and strategic allocation
of resources have consequences for the degree of inequality within a polity. Acemoglu and
Robinson (2006, p.2-7) use the distribution of resources as a parameter that affect the
de facto political power between groups. They consider distribution of resources to be
endogenously linked to political regimes where the distribution of resources in t shape
the future economic institutions and thereby the future allocation of resources in t + 1
(Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006, p.2-7). In the introductory I establish a causal model
that include corruption in this process; corruption is by definition related to the alloca-
tion of resources (see Section 2.1), and thus interlinked with the level of inequality. The
choice of political regime is also linked to economic conditions and political resources in
the theoretical framework of Boix (2003, p.27-46); “Besides the distribution and nature
of economic assets, the choice of political regime is affected by the political and organi-
zational resources of the parties in contention”3. Each individual supporting the political
regime which redistribute in such a way that it maximizes its welfare. A result of his main
model find that the likelihood of democracy increases the more egalitarian the allocation
of resources are. Acemoglu, Robinson and Verdier (2006, p.36-38) does not reach such
3Boix (2003, p.22) distinguish mainly between poor and rich, but extend the model to include class
structure. The utility of each group is linear in income, and there are four political states in the frame-
work: authoritarianism, communism, democracy, and revolutionary war
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a clear prediction; when inequality is high the likelihood of revolutions are higher, but
the ones getting the private goods are more likely to use repression in order to keep their
position in place. Therefore, inequality, and the prospect of democracy, can go both ways
dependent on the strategic choices of those gaining the most from inequality.
Acemoglu, Robinson and Verdier (2006, p.36-38) have a similar line of reasoning for
the effect of inequality on consolidation of democracies; democracies redistribute resources
away from the top (the elite); this will in turn influence the prospect of democracy; if too
much wealth is redistributed away from the elite, the more discontent among this group;
that might increase the probability of the elite mounting a coup. Therefore, the higher
the level of inequality when a country becomes democratic, the less likely that regime is
to succeed (the more is redistributed away from the top)).
Kleptocracy and government stability. Institutional design affects the prospect
and sustainability of corrupt- and kleptocratic governments. Robinson (2004, p.189),
develop a theoretical model trying to explain how “kleptocratic rulers that expropriate
the wealth and income of their citizens remain in power without a significant base of
support in society”. The model predict that the success of such rulers rely on their ability
to use “divide-and-rule” as a political strategy (ibid.). Even though the model first and
foremost explain stable governments with corrupt and kleptocratic traits within weakly
institutional frameworks, the model also consist of implications for institutional stability;
a klepocratic rule must weaken and complicate the coordination of political opponents
with incentives to change the institutional framework. Przeworski et al. (2000, p.123-125)
support this notion by providing empirical evidence that intra-regime instability (rapid
leadership turnover) influence the stability of political regimes. Robinson (2004) therefore
offers an explanation, with implications for regime stability, for why weakly (inconsistent)
institutional countries that does not provide the welfare of its citizens can sustain given
that the rulers strategically allocate state resources. Furthermore, Bueno de Mesquita
and Smith (2010, p.32), argues that natural resources can help sustain institutions that
favor a small ruling elite by enabling the leadership to allocate private goods in exchange
for political support.
Oil and natural resources. Authoritarian regimes with access to oil or other nat-
ural resources tend to last longer (Boix 2003, p.12; Morrison, 2006, p.365-368). Busse
and Gro¨ning (2011, p.9-10) find an empirical relationship between the degree of natural
resources export and corruption, so this argues in favour of controlling for the level of
natural resources when explaning the consequences of corruption. Smith (2008, p.781)
explain why and how the effect of natural resources shape policies by looking at the
prospect of survival given internal political competition and revolutionary threats, and
state that “[c]oalition size determines whether free resources are spent to enhance societal
well-being or used as rewards for the leader and her cronies”. A small coalition size and
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the presence of natural resources, foster autocratic change that limit the degree of public
goods spending. An initial large coalition size and natural resources foster democratic
change benefiting the society at large. While natural resources increase the threat of
revolution by increasing the incentives for citizens to support political movements advo-
cating more inclusive political systems (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, 2010, p.781), the
pressure on kleptocratic leaders intensify and the divide-and-rule strategies becomes an
ever more important determinant of the duration of kleptocratic governments and insti-
tutions (Robinson, 2004, p.163-164). Also, the strength of institutions, and their ability
to restrict and hold leaders accountable to citizens influence the prospect of corruption
and kleptocracy, and the duration of such regimes Robinson (2004, p.163).
Summary. There are two main approaches to understanding the consequences of
corruption for institutional duration; the strategic element highlighting what agents want
and how they use available resources, and the structural highlighting the intermediate ef-
fect of corruption institutional duration through the influence on productivity, income and
growth. We know from the literature on institutional stability that consistent political
regimes tend to last longer than inconsistent ones (Gates et al., 2006; Gurr, 1974). Also,
economic growth and wealth, type of economy, political neighborhood, income equality,
and political history are associated with stability (Gates et al., 2006, 900-02; Gurr 1974;
Przeworski et al. 2000, chap.2; Sanhueza 1999, 354-355). Furthermore, several studies
treat the level of corruption as an endogenous effect of political regimes and institutions
which favours an interaction term between the two when explaining the duration of po-
litical regimes (Amundsen, 1999; Gunardi, 2008; Hegre and Fjelde, 2011; Montinola and
Jackman, 2002; Treisman, 2000, 2007).
2.3 The theoretical framework
The theoretical framework presented in Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) account for
the challenges and strategies that lead to political survival in response to three treats:
(1) domestic challenges to leadership, (2) revolutionary challenges to the political sys-
tem, and (3) external threats. While institutional survival is not the main focus of their
framework, they elaborate on institutional stability in Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003,
chap. 8), and in “Political Survival and Endogenous Institutional Change” (Bueno de
Mesquita and Smith, 2010). The remainder of this section applies the selectorate the-
ory in order to understanding the relationship between corruption and the duration of
political regimes. When trying to maximize the length of tenure, political leaders must
satisfy the needs of the winning coalition (source of political support) while at the same
time prevent any institutional threat from the selectorate (those with ability to choose
leaders) and the disenfranchised (those without any form of political power). All in all,
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given that political leaders value political survival, we can account for and analyze the
institutional consequences occurring as a result of domestic threats to the political leaders
themselves, and the institutions/regime that secures their tenure and power. The alloca-
tion of resources, in terms of private and public goods, is a crucial strategic tool available
for political leaders in securing future political power and sustaining the current political
regime. Corruption, by definition a private good Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003, p.200),
can therefore be evaluated as a strategic choice securing the wealth and welfare of the
leadership and societal groups.
The size and influence of different societal groups given by the formal properties of
the political regime in question, in combination with the current allocation of resources,
are the main determinants of regime duration. If the allocation of resources is incom-
patible with the incentive structure of the political regime, we can expect an increase
in destabilizing events (e.g. coup attempts, riots, revolution attempts, demonstrations
and government crisis). Political instability and civil unrest may not necessarily lead
to a change in the political regime. The prospect of regime duration in light of polit-
ical instability and civil unrest varies according to the formal properties of the current
political regime. Arriving at this insight requires a thorough discussion of private and
public goods, the welfare of societal groups, their preferences over political regimes and
the implications of resource allocation for political stability, civil unrest and the dura-
tion of political regimes. I therefore organize the theoretical presentation in a stepwise
manner with definitions and discussions according to the following list of sub elements:
(1) baseline motivation, (2) agents, (3) political regimes, (4) public and private goods,
(5) corruption and the allocation of resources, (6) preferences over political regimes, and
last (7) an overview of potential actions that affects the duration of political regimes. An
overall summary of the theoretical expectations and specification of the hypotheses are
found in the last section of this chapter.
The baseline motivation. The unit of analysis in the selectorate theory is political
leaders, and societal groups that seek access to current and future political power. The
main motivation of political leaders are: “[p]olitical leaders are motivated first to gain and
retain political power and, conditional on meeting that goal, to maximize their discre-
tionary control over government revenue” (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, 2009, p.171).
This baseline motivation is similar to the initial theoretical starting point of the replica-
tion framework in Gates et al. (2006, p.894): “a political executive’s primary incentive is
to maximize his/her current and future power and authority”. The baseline motivation is
the starting point for understanding the predictions derived from the framework concern-
ing the stability of political regimes. It is the core assumption that is used to understand
strategic interaction, and the outcome that follows from the interaction among agents and
societal groups. Given the specification of the baseline motivation, leaders are expected
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to allocate resources strategically in order to remain in office. Remaining in office also
depends on the current political regime. Any change in the current political regime would
be an act in line with the baseline motivation; either in order to remain in power, or to
extract more resources for private gains.
Agents. The selectorate theory distinguish between four main societal groups that are
subsets of the citizenry (N): the leadership (L), the winning coalition (W ), the selectorate
(S), and the disenfranchised (D). The leadership is the individual, or group of individuals,
with “the authority to raise revenue and allocate resources” (Bueno de Mesquita et al.,
2003, p.38). The size of the leadership varies according to the institutional design of a
given political regime. Access and opportunity to shape the allocation of resources is the
main source of political power, and grants the leadership with several strategies in order
to maximize current and future political power. The welfare of societal groups are linked
to choice of the distributive strategy of the leadership, and the type of goods allocated,
discussed further below.
The leadership depends on the political support of the winning coalition in order to
remain in office. The role of the winning coalition is best understood in relation to the
selectorate. The selectorate as a group have two main characteristics; (1) the selectorate
are involved in selecting leaders, and (2) have the possibility to become member of the
winning coalition (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003, p.331). The subset of the selectorate
that “endows the leadership with political power over the remainder of the selectorate as
well as over the disenfranchised members of the society” (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003,
p.51), are labeled the winning coalition.
If we evaluate the relationship between L, W , S and D in the United Kingdom (UK),
we know from the design of the electoral system, often just called “first past the post”,
that all citizens above the age of 18 with citizenship have the right to vote. The candidate
that receives the plurality of votes within each electoral district is elected “Member of
Parliament” (MP) (Lijphart, 1999, p.15). The party with the majority of MP’s can form
the executive government, the “cabinet” (L), which commonly consist of MP’s from the
party with the majority of seats in the parliament.4 In sum, a winning coalition in
contemporary UK is, according to the differentiation of societal groups in the selectorate
theory and due to the electoral system, one fourth of the citizenry with the right to vote
in elections (i.e. the selectorate), given that every member of the selectorate votes in an
election. The relative size of W is therefore determined by the size of the citizenry that can
vote, and based on traits of the electoral system (e.g. plural, majoritarian, proportional
etc.). Most contemporary democracies have developed universal suffrage since the second
4Even though there have been some coalition and minority governments (e.g. from 1918 to 1945),
which would alter the actual size of W , majority single-party governments are the most common in the
UK (Lijphart, 1999, p.10-11), and also the most illustrative in this case.
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half of the twentieth century, and most of the newly established democracies include
universal suffrage (Przeworski, 2009, p.291). The leadership in contemporary UK equals
the executive cabinet selected from the MP’s (representatives of W ), a fraction of the
actual size of the winning coalition.
In autocratic regimes, elections are not the main channel of political participation.5
The size of W and S are determined by other factors in autocracies. The main channel of
participation and executive recruitment varies, but overall the size of both W and S are
smaller in autocratic regimes than in democracies. Monarchies, military juntas, single
party dictatorships have different sizes of W and S, but they are smaller than the size
of W and S in democracies (regardless of electoral system). Autocratic regimes limit
the size of the selectorate to include those with a particular position, heritage or party
membership Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003, p.69-74).
From the size of W and S to political regimes. The definition of W , S and D
relates the size of each group to the political regime types used in the empirical section
of this thesis. The size of each group are mainly intended to be evaluated as a continuum
rather than categorical political regimes.6 The larger the winning coalition the more a
political regime resembles a democracy. The smaller the size of W the more a political
regime resembles autocracy.
The distinction between autocracies and democracies based on the differentiation be-
tween societal groups presented within the selectorate theory framework, is visualized in
Figure 2.1. The entire line represent the total population, the citizenry (N), and each
group is a subset of the total population. The comparative statics of the selectorate
theory are directly linked to the size of each group, as this affects other important pa-
rameters such as public and private goods allocation Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003,
p.130). A typical autocratic regime, as seen in the top of Figure 2.1, are political systems
characterized by small winning coalitions, small selectorates and thereby a large group of
disenfranchised citizens (i.e. without formal political power). Democracies, seen in the
bottom of Figure 2.1, are characterized by large winning coalitions and large selectorates.
In democracies, the selectorate usually equals the electorate, and as a consequence the
5There are of course autocratic regimes that do hold election such as Egypt, Singapore, and Uzbekistan
during the 1990s (Levitsky and Way, 2002, p.54). However, the election results does not directly translate
into the de jure political power, nor the actual size of W as election fraud, repression, exclusion and other
strategies are often used by the leadership in order to control the outcome of elections (Schedler, 2002,
p.104-109). Electoral systems and elections are therefore not direct determinants of the selectorate and
winning coalition size. In addition, autocratic regimes with democratic traits or a democratic regime
with autocratic traits constitutes inconsistent regimes.
6Note that when translating the size of W and S into categorical political regimes I do so in accordance
with the examples used in Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003, p.69-74), but these categorizations are meant
to be interpreted as analogies. In fact, Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003, p.72) write that “[t]hough it is
simple to relate W and S to well-known regime types, we make a conscious effort to move away from
categorical discussions of political systems”. For a further discussion of the similarities between size the
of W , S and political regimes see Section 3.2.
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size of disenfranchised group is small equaling those that are not allowed to vote in elec-
tions. As mentioned earlier, the actual ratio between W and S depend upon electoral
system where the example presented in Figure 2.1 represent a majoritarian electoral sys-
tem indicating that the party, or coalition of political parties, with the majority votes





Figure 2.1: The distinction between autocracies and democracies based on the differ-
entiation of societal groups presented in Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003, p.69-74): the
winning coalition (W ), the selectorate (S) and the disenfranchised (D) as subsets of the
total population (N)
The ratio between W and S (W/S) are interpreted as an indicator of “the loyalty
norm” (, 65-68). The loyalty norm is important since it has implications of the level
of domestic competition, and secondly which strategies and actions the leadership must
apply in order to maximize current and future political power. Similar to the size of W
and S, the ratio W/S also translated into categorical political regimes. In democracies,
the loyalty norm is weak meaning that the size of the winning coalition is large and
the selectorate is large. The leadership therefore must spend more in order to maintain
domestic political support from the winning coalition. In autocracies, when the size of the
winning coalition is small compared to the size of the selectorate, the ratio is low meaning
that the loyalty norm is strong. This enables the leadership to allocate less in exchange for
political support. In other words, when the loyalty norm is weak the leadership has more
to lose, and when the loyalty norm is strong the winning coalition has more to lose. This
implies that the leadership allocates more resources in order to maintain political support
when the W/S-ratio is large (low loyalty norm), and the winning coalition accepts less in
exchange for political support when the W/S-ratio is low (high loyalty norm).
A change in the size of W and S, and thereby also the W/S-ratio, are interpreted as
a change in the institutional framework (the political regime). In order to understand
how change and duration of political regimes are determined, I turn to define how the
size of W , S, and the W/S-ratio affects the types and modes of goods allocation within
a political regime. The allocation of goods shapes the preferences over political regimes
and the welfare of each societal group, and the change and duration of political regimes
are analyzed as a consequence of the mismatch between preferences and the current
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allocation of de jure and de facto political power. In other words, the starting point for
understanding the duration of political regimes must define goods, and the relationship
between goods, preferences and utility. It is according to these properties, that the
strategies and actions affecting the duration of political regimes are understood. I now
turn to evaluate the indicators of utility within the selectorate theory framework focusing
on how the allocation of resources influences the welfare of societal groups.
Utility: public and private goods. Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) distinguish
between public- and private goods, where the distribution of state revenue (the total
pool of resources) falls along a private-public goods continuum. Corruption is close to
the private goods end of the scale, exclusively in the interest of the leadership and the
supporters of the regime (the winning coalition). Increasing the level of one type of good
(e.g. private) means less of the other (e.g. public), so defining corruption as a private
goods simultaneously means that corruption is a negative public good. When there is a
high degree of corruption, fewer resources are available for other purposes. The mix, and
level of each, is determined by the strategic environment within each political regime.
All else equal, the size of the winning coalition is the main indicator of mode and type
of goods allocation. The leadership allocates resources in a strategic manner in order to
remain in power and maximize discretionary use of state resources.
The allocation of private or public goods affects the welfare of societal groups. Bueno
de Mesquita et al. (2003, chap.5) defines a set of core and general private and public
goods, and link the allocation of these according to the size of the winning coalition and
the selectorate. The particular goods (i.e. in which form the goods are allocated) are
not specified directly, but “depend on the personal tastes and the needs of the winning
coalition, selectorate, and leadership” (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003, p.179). Core
public goods refer to goods such as civil liberties, political rights, transparency, peace,
and prosperity; examples of general public goods within the theoretical framework are
education, health care, and social security (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003, p.179-198).
Private goods are exclusively allocated to members of the winning coalition. In this sense,
corruption, patronage, cronyism and nepotism are good example of a private goods.7
The leadership allocates what is necessary in order to sustain political support among
the winning coalition (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003, p.29-30). If W is small, i.e.
autocratic regimes, it is less costly to supply private goods. If W is large, i.e. democracies,
it is less costly to supply public goods due to the large size of the coalition. The overall
insight is that all leaders, and political regimes, require some form of support (no leaders
rule alone). The distribution of resources is therefore a strategic instrument for political
7Note that the examples of private goods used in Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2002, p.559) overlaps
with both the conceptualization of corruption, and the operationalization used in the empirical models.
Therefore, higher levels on the corruption index correspond to an increase in private goods.
22 CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE AND THEORY
and institutional survival. The welfare of the selectorate and the disenfranchised is strictly
linked to public goods, while the winning coalitions welfare is increases with private goods
when the initial size of the winning coalition is low, and increasing in public goods when
the initial size of the coalition is large (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003, p.390). It is in
the interest of the leadership to spend as little as possible of the available resources, and
thereby maximize the available discretionary funds. Before discussing the implications
the provision of goods have for the stability of the political regimes, I elaborate on the
implications of corruption for the welfare of societal groups.
Corruption and the allocation of resources. In relation to the allocation of
goods, and thereby the welfare of societal groups, corruption is one of several strategies
for the allocation of private goods. Therefore, evaluating the degree of corruption as a
strategy for political survival and sustaining the current political regime leads us to derive
predictions concerning the consequences of corruption based on the formal properties of
the political regime. In other words, the consequences of corruption are linked to the
initial size of societal groups. Corruption increases as the size of W is decreasing, and
decreasing as the size of W is increasing. The prospects of corruption are greater in au-
tocratic regimes than in democracies. In this sense corruption and political regimes are
endogenous: “..., the extent to which leaders attempt to detect and eradicate corruption
depends upon institutional arrangements” (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2002, p.582). How-
ever, the degree of corruption in relation to the incentive structure of a political regime
can destabilize the regime if corruption occurs while being incompatible with the utility
functions of groups with de jure political power.
The incentive and possibility of corruption is greater in autocratic regimes making the
duration of such political regimes less affected by corruption. In fact, since corruption can
serve as a strategic element of reward for the winning coalition, corruption can increase
the duration of autocratic regimes by making the winning coalition more dependent on
private goods, and thereby have more to loose from changing the political regime (Bueno
de Mesquita et al., 2002, p.582). Democracies, more dependent on public goods allocation
in order to support their current and future political power, is a less attractive strategy
for the leadership as it is incompatible with incentives of both the winning coalition,
the selectorate and the citizenry at large. Democracies with a high degree of corruption
are therefore likely to experience political turmoil, civil unrest and popular discontent in
general that potentially may result in a change in the existing political regime.
The ideal ratio between coalition and selectorate size for autocratic leaders is to try
an engineer the coalition size as small as possible while simultaneously increasing the
selectorate as much as possible. When coalition size is small compared to the selectorate
(strong loyalty norm), leaders need not spend much private gains in order to gain political
support, and does not need to provide extensive public goods. This is also the institutional
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design that creates the foundation for kleptocracy, defined as “...not mere corruption, but
rather the outright theft of a nation’s income by its leaders” (Bueno de Mesquita et al.,
2003, p.131). The opportunities of corruption and kleptocary depends on the size of the
winning coalition. When W increases the overall allocation of public goods increases, and
the allocation of private goods increases as W decreases. Overall, the total expenditure
of state revenue increases as with W and decrease when S increase. Furthermore, the
opportunity of kleptocracy relates to the “discretionary founds” of political leaders; the
surplus (revenue-expenditure) in combination with initial size of W (when low) predicts
that kleptocracy and corruption increases in small W systems (Bueno de Mesquita et al.,
2003, p.130-132). The structural effect of such a scenario should manifest itself through
high levels of taxation, low economic growth and income per capita. The presence of
natural resources, foreign aid or more generally what Smith (2008, p.780) label“unearned”
or “free” resources should increase the likelihood of corruption and kleptocracy.
Preferences over political regimes. I present the institutional preferences of each
group by answering the following question: how would the different groups alter the
institutional framework given the opportunity? This question implies two things: (1)
societal groups would alter the political regime in order to maximize their utility/welfare,
and (2) there are constraints preventing societal groups from changing the political regime
in favor of their preferences. The preferences over political regimes are closely linked to
the allocation of public and private goods defined above.
The leadership prefer autocracy with a small winning coalition and large selectorate (a
strong loyalty norm). Autocratic leaders have a longer expected tenure than democratic-
and semi-democratic leaders (Przeworski et al., 2000, p.51), so it is a reasonable assump-
tion (both theoretically and empirically) to state that any incumbent favor autocracy
both if the main motivation is political survival. The welfare of the leadership, defined
as tenure length, is therefore increasing when the size winning coalition is decreasing and
the selectorate size is increasing. The available discretionary funds also increase under
such circumstances as the leadership can limit the degree of public goods.
The selectorate and the disenfranchised prefer large W political regime (democracies)
due to the expected increase in public goods in democratic regimes. Since S and D only
can increase their welfare by extending the provision of public goods within a political
regime (only W and L receives public goods), these groups would alter the political regime
in the direction of democracy given no constraints on their actions.
Compared to the other agents/groups, the winning coalitions has less obvious prefer-
ences over political regimes. This is due to the curvilinear utility function of the coalition;
the winning coalition favour a strong weak loyalty norm (large W/S) since this induces
the leadership to spend more in return for political support. However, dependent on the
initial size of W extending the size of the coalition diminishes the level of private goods
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attained. Hence, it the size of W is initially small, extending the coalition size would
impact the welfare of the winning coalition negatively since the share of private goods
are spread among more members. When the coalition reaches a threshold, it is a better
strategy for the leadership to allocate public goods. At this switch, the welfare of the
winning coalition increases. When W is sufficiently large the winnng coalition gain more
from public goods that benefit all citizens than from private goods (Bueno de Mesquita
et al., 2003, p.335). Decreasing the coalition size increases the level of private goods for
each member of the winning coalition. Also, this corresponds to a strong loyalty norm
which makes the leadership less dependent on the coalition. More preciesely, the leader-
ship can allocate less resources in exhange for political support since each member of the
coalition have everything to lose from being excluded.
Given the opportunity to chose, different societal groups would change the existing
political regime in order to maximize their welfare (according to their institutional pref-
erences described above). A brief summary suggest that the disenfranchised would alter
institutions in the direction of democracy and thereby increase the allocation of public
goods, political influence and thereby increase the probability of winning coalition mem-
bership. The selectorate, those with a probability of winning coalition membership larger
than zero would also democratize, but would under ideal circumstances only extend the
size of the winning coalition while keeping the selectorate fixed (e.g. not extend to include
the disenfranchised). The selectorate and the disenfranchised have the same agenda when
W is small and S is large, but differ when the size of S is initially small; then S would not
have a clear cut preference over institution since the probability of becoming a member of
W is large when S is small. The disenfranchised would not gain any private goods under
autocracy and therefore obviously prefer democracy and a greater focus on public goods
that increase the overall welfare of this group. Corruption could also give the selectorate
a greater incentive towards autocracy since they gain political access through informal
channels that can compensate for lost public goods given that they already have a posi-
tive probability of inclusion in W . However, when the choice is between large W large S
and small W large S, all citizens outside of W prefer the first option.
The winning coalition would alter institutions dependent on the probability of further
membership in W ; if any member could decrease the size of W while at the same time be
certain of membership they would do so, and thereby increase the share of private goods.
Overall, the winning coalition favor decreasing the selectorate size, and thereby weakening
the loyalty norm. The leadership is interested in keeping the winning coalition low and
the selectorate large so that the loyalty norm is strong, and the discretionary founds of
the leader larger. Under such circumstances, the leader spend little private goods in order
to maintain political support by W , and does not require to allocate public goods. Also,
the selectorate will have a small probability of gaining membership to W , but members
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of W are loyal due to the exclusiveness of the position and the perks that follow. (Bueno
de Mesquita et al., 2003, p.329-338)
The preferences of each societal group lead to a better understanding of the strategies
and actions that are likely to unfold given the right circumstances. The understanding
regime endurance is linked to the preferences of societal groups, and to which degree the
current regime shapes the welfare of each group. I now turn to describe some actions
and counteractions that are likely to occur from the definition of the welfare functions
and preferences of each societal group. The conditions that affect the likelihood of these
events are also the conditions that affect the duration of political regimes.
Actions and counteractions. The preferences over institutions/regime are the
starting point for understanding the duration of political regimes. These preferences
are linked to policies through public and private goods allocation. In other words, the
prospect of regime duration is linked to the allocation of goods, and to which degree
goods increase the utility of societal groups. At a minimum, the allocation of resources
must secure the welfare of the winning coalition. This is in the best interest of the
leadership, as the winning coalition is the source of political survival and stability of the
regime. However, the leadership and the winning coalition are not the only groups that
can alter or prolong the current political regime. Under certain circumstances, members
of the winning coalition, the selectorate and the disenfranchised take actions seeking to
alter the political regime in favor of their preferences or to increase their welfare. This
increases the degree of political instability and civil unrest that potentially leads to an
alteration of the current poltical regime. The scenarios in which such actions are likely
depend on the current political regimes ability to secure the welfare of these groups.
Preferences over political regimes are latent and known, and the welfare of groups (or
lack of welfare) is the factor that potentially manifests preferences into actions. I now
turn to describe set of particular actions: coups and government crisis, riots, revolutions
and demonstrations that are linked to political instability and civil unrest. The duration
of political regimes thus depends on the on the ability to overcome and prevent such
actions from overthrowing the regime. In sum, the prospects of regime duration given
the initial level of de jure and de facto political power among societal groups, and “those
conditions under which leaders can best overcome the opposition of other groups” (Bueno
de Mesquita and Smith, 2010, p.182).
What each societal group prefer (what they would do given lack of constraints) set
the basics for understanding the dynamical relationship that affect the probability of
institutional change and duration. The duration of a particular political regime is thus
sustainable as long as the welfare of the group with ability to alter political institutions
is satisfied. This dynamic is not straightforward, as the initial distribution of political
power (both de jure and de facto) among societal groups vary greatly across time and
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space. The preferences over poltical regimes of the winning coalition are the least straight
forward (most dependent on the initial size of the coalition). In autocracies (small W )
the coalition receive private goods in return for political support. The level of private
goods attained by each member of the coalition increased as the size of W decreases. In
democracies (large W ) the utility of the coalition is increasing with the level of public
goods spending. The welfare of the winning coalition is an increasing function of public
goods once the initial size of the coalition reaches a cirtical mass. While the leadership
prefer a strong loyalty norm (low W/S) the coaltion prefer the opposite. When the
loyalty norm is weak, the leadership is forced to spend more private goods in order to
attain the support of the coalition. A strong loyalty norm, on the other hand, enables
the leadership to spend less private goods on the coalition as the coalition members can
easily be replaced. Two things follow from these preferences: (1) the leadership seeks to
decrease the size of the winning coalition and increase the size of the selectorate in order
to strengthen the loyalty norm, (2) the winning coalition seek to weaken the loyalty norm
and gain more access to private goods.
Change in political regime can occur through purges or extension of the winning
coalition by the leadership. The specific choice is linked to threats and actions by the
citizenry and opposition. Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003, p.392) label these threats
anti-governmental in the sense that such action are caused by dissatisfaction among the
groups other than the actual leadership. Coups, revolutions, riots, demonstration and
government crisis are examples of particular actions induced by the disenfranchised, the
selectorate or the winning coalition in order to attain a larger share of state revenues, or
shift the allocation of goods.
Whether the result in fact lead to such reallocation or a change in the formal properties
of the political regime depend on the strategic response of the leadership. The baseline
motivation is political survival, so when facing credible threats the leadership must chose
to contract or extend the public goods spending in order to prevent the threats from
leading loss of leadership position to the opposition, and potentially a change in the
political regime. The size of the disenfranchised group is larger in autocracies than
democracies. By this fact alone one could expect there to be greater political instability in
autocratic regimes than in democratic, but the lack of public goods makes coordination of
resistance more difficult. Simultaneously, autocratic regimes have small winning coalitions
with a high degree of loyalty to the leadership. In other words, the winning coalition
has everything to lose from extending the winning coalition and shifting the resource
allocation from private to public goods. In small W political regimes the welfare of
the winning coalition is increasing along with private goods. The leadership also gains
more discretionary resources under such circumstances. In sum, political regimes with
small winning coalitions are often more repressive and oppressive as a strategy of keeping
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anti-governmental and institutional actions at bay.
The disenfranchised prefer democracy, or large W political systems, due to the in-
creased likelihood of public goods spending in such political regimes. There are a range
of actions that can serve as a mean to attain that end (democracy) ranging from riots and
demonstrations to revolutions and civil war (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003, p.364-382).
The risk such actions bring with them varies according to the current political regime
and de facto political power (the distribution of resources) of the leadership and the win-
ning coalition. These factors indicate which counteractions are more likely to follow from
a specific set of actions as well as the oppressive and repressive nature of the current
political regime. From this point of view the likelihood of anti-government action, civil
unrest and political instability are expected to be greater in autocratic regimes since the
size of the disenfranchised group is larger. At the same time, this does not necessarily
mean that these set of actions in fact occur. The occurrences of political actions aimed
at altering the political regime also depend on the oppressive and repressive capabilities
of the current political regime which is likely to be a more credible threat in autocratic
regimes with a strong loyalty norm. Stated differently, autocratic regimes are more likely
to strike down anti-governmental action since the leadership and the winning coalition
have more to loose from extending the winning coalition (democratization).
Given that the leadership wants to decrease the size of the winning coalition, thereby
strengthening the loyalty norm and increasing their available discretionary funds, and the
fact that this preference is not shared by the citizenry at large, the duration of political
regimes with small winning coalition depend on a lack of revolutionary threat and repres-
sive actions from the leadership and winning coalition. The likelihood of repression as a
strategic action increases the smaller the size of the winning coalition. The smaller the
winning coalition, the greater the focus on private goods allocation in order to maintain
the support of the winning coalition; such institutions therefore offer little public goods
increasing the incentive of the current winning coalition to maintain the status quo (in-
creased loyalty norm, more to lose if removed from the winning coalition). Repression is
therefore supported by the winning coalition if the overall size of the coalition is small.
The welfare of the winning coalition also, along with the welfare of the citizenry at large,
increases along with the allocation of public goods when the size of the winning coalition
reaches a critical size. The welfare of the winning coalition is therefore high both when
the size of the coalition is low (gain private goods) and when the coalition size is large
(gain public goods). According to the initial size of the coalition, the prospect of future
welfare will either be increasing alongside private or public goods, and the determining
factor shaping the institutional preferences of the winning coalition in the future, t + 1,
is the size of the winning coalition at the present point in time, t. Translated to political
regimes, we can expect that the winning coalition in autocratic regimes prefer the current
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institutional framework due to the allocation of private goods from the leadership to the
coalition in order to gain political support, and the same applies to the leadership since
the allocation of private goods are less demanding on state revenue than public goods
thereby increasing the discretionary funds available. In democracies, however, the ini-
tial size of the winning coalition is large, making the coalition prefer allocation of public
goods rather than private. This preference stand in contrast to the leadership, but the
leadership is forced to comply in order to maintain domestic political support, and will
therefore support policies and actions that democratize the institutional framework. For
intermediate (inconsistent) regimes, the wide variety of coalition sizes and constraints
make a summary expectation difficult.
The main trend suggested by the theory is that all anti-government actions increase
as the size of the winning coalition decreases, and, as the size of the disenfranchised group
increases. This is linked to the allocation of private resources that follows from an de-
crease in the size of W . However, as I have argued, corruption also increases the level of
political instability and civil unrest in democracies. A high degree of corruption decreases
the level of public goods which thereby decreases the welfare of the selectorate and the
disenfranchised. Another explanation, consistent with the parameters in the theoretical
framework, is that democracies provide public goods which in turn increases social mo-
bility, coordination, and the resources available to the selectorate. Anti-governmental
actions do not necessarily mean that the intended outcome of the protest is to alter the
institutional framework, but rather a channel of government protest (e.g. holding the
government accountable). Anti-governmental actions in democracies are more likely to
target the de facto allocation of resources since the level of de jure political power is
an equilibrium outcome for everyone except the leadership. Anti-government actions are
therefore not necessarily an act of institutional discontent, but more an act of discon-
tent concerning the current distribution of resources. If anti-governmental actions are
intended to alter the institutional framework, the political regime, it is either as an act
of autocratization by the winning coalition seeking to replace the leadership and decrease
the overall size of the winning coalition, or an act aimed at further democratization by
the selectorate.8
2.4 Summary of expectations and hypotheses
The selectorate theory links the allocation of resources in terms of public and private
goods to institutional instability (i.e. the duration of political regimes) through events
leading to civil unrest and political instability. Coups, riots, revolutions, demonstrations
8In democracies, the selectorate are the source of anti-government actions such as riots, demonstrations
and revolutions while in autocracies the source of protest is the disenfranchised.
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and governmental crisis are examples of such events. These events are however intervening
factors that implicitly links the effect of corruption to the duration of political regimes.
In order to motivate these theoretical assumptions I hypothesize and test the following
proposition:
Hypothesis 1 Corruption increases the chances of coup attempts, riots, revolution at-
tempts, demonstrations and major government crisis.
All of these events are intervening factors that may lead to change in the political
regime. However, the literature review and the theoretical framework suggest that the
consequences of corruption depend on the nature of the political regime. The formal
properties of a political regime shape the allocation of de jure political power, the welfare
of groups, and the distribution of public and private goods. Corruption also affect the
allocation of resources, and thereby the distribution of de facto political power. The
distribution of political power within a country in turn affect the duration of a particular
political regime, and in addition to the inherit properties of political regimes to endure
over time, I hypothesize that the effect of corruption is dependent on different political
regimes. Corruption increases the chances of civil unrest and political instability across
political regimes, but the strategies available to the leadership and winning coalition in
preventing the consequences of corruption to affect the stability of the political regime
vary between political regimes. Corruption affects the distribution of resources, the al-
location of political power, and thereby the welfare of societal groups which are central
determinants of regime duration. The interaction between de jure and de facto political
power, and the strategies available given by formal and informal political power leads to
the main hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2 The effect of corruption on the duration of political regimes depends on
the formal properties of a given political regime.
The specific direction of the interaction between corruption and political regimes on
duration is specified in the two following hypotheses. Democracies are political regimes
defined by a large winning coalitions (the political base of support of the leadership)
and large selectorate size (those that potentially can become members of the winning
coalition), where the baseline motivation of any political leadership is gain and hold
on to political power (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, 2009, p.171; Bueno de Mesquita
and Smith 2010, p.937). Following the logic of the selectorate theory, the leadership
are better off allocating public goods once the winning coalition reaches a critical mass.
The larger the winning coalition, the more private goods must to allocated in order to
maintain political support, so in effect the leadership and the winning coalition are better
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off allocating goods that benefit all members of society. Even though one could argue
that corruption is in the best interest of the leadership, this incentive is not supported
by the citizenry at large. I hypothesize that corruption is not sustainable in democratic
regimes. A corrupt leadership in democracies can be expected to increase popular unrest
and increase the level of domestic political challenge with incentives to change or alter
the institutional framework. Or the other way around; it will create a disproportionate
amount of de facto political power at the top, and thereby increasing the incentive among
those with informal political power to alter the institutions to meet their preferences. In
democracies I hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 3 Corruption decreases the duration of democratic regimes.
The welfare of the winning coalition and the leadership in autocratic regimes increases
alongside the level of private goods. In order to maintain domestic political support, the
leadership must secure the welfare of the winning coalition by allocating private goods.
Corruption, by definition a private good, will therefore strengthen the political support
of the leadership, and at the same time increase the welfare of the winning coalition.
Alternatively, corruption can be seen as a negative public good, but the strategic oppor-
tunity of private goods allocation and the distribution of political power through clientil-
ism (CHECK SPELLING) and patronage are expected to lower political threats to the
regime by the strategic allocation of private goods to societal groups with opportunity to
influence the future political regime. This is the rationale behind the next hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4 Corruption increases the duration of autocratic regimes.
I use inconsistent regimes as a reference category for two reasons: (1) in order for the
main analyses to be consistent with the replication framework of Gates et al. (2006), (2)
and to compare the political regimes in which the core predictions from the theoretical
framework are the most clear cut. In terms of the sub indicators used to measure polit-
ical regimes and the theoretical definition linking political regimes to the ratio between
winning coalition size and the selectorate size, there a great varieties within the regime
label inconsistent regimes. Since the main theoretical predictions for the duration of po-
litical regimes are linked to the welfare of groups given different initial sizes, the variety
within inconsistent groups on these indicators confuses the expectations. For example,
we would end up making the same predictions concerning the duration of LAND and
LAND while in fact the political regimes in these two countries during this period would
lead to predictions in opposite directions. However, while the direction is not consistent
across all inconsistent regimes, they are at the same time expected to be less durable than
democratic and autocratic regimes, and are thereby well suited as a reference category
when evaluating the conditions influencing the duration of political regimes.
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All in all, I hypothesize that the effect of corruption is conditional on political regimes,
and that the implications of several of the sub indicators of the corruption-index (e.g.
patronage, vote buying) vary according to the formal properties of a political regime.
It is the effect of corruption on the welfare of groups, allocation of political power and
resources that are expected to trigger events (such as civil unrest, domestic political
competition and coups) consequential to the duration of political regimes. Democracies
are less likely to survive when corruption is widespread. For autocratic regimes I expect
the opposite. In autocracies, corruption can be a strategy that allocates political power
to groups that threaten the stability of the regime. Next I organize the empirical tests
of the propositions put forth in this section. Overall, I do not test the intervening effect
of anti-government action on the duration of political regimes. Rather, I organize the
empirical assessment around the effect of corruption in both cases. First I analyze the
effect of corruption on political instability and civil unrest. The second and main empirical
analyses the interaction effect between corruption and political regime to the duration
of political regimes in the period 1984-2008. Before testing the theoretical hypotheses, I
now turn to the research design.
32 CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE AND THEORY
Chapter 3
Research Design
The results in this thesis are derived using two different statistical methods. First I use
several logistic regression models to evaluate the effect of corruption on events such as
coups, government crisis, riots, revolutions and demonstrations. These events are in the
theoretical framework indirectly linked to the stability of political regimes. In other words,
they reflect political instability and civil unrest, and are therefore intervening factors that
may result in a breakdown of political regimes. Second, using survival analysis, I evaluate
the interaction effect between corruption and formal properties of a political regime on
the duration of political regimes in the period 1984-2008.
The unit of analysis in the logistic regression models is country-year observations.
The unit of analysis in the main analyses, the survival models, is political regimes and
their duration measured in years where country-year observations are nested within each
political regime. A political regime is defined according to an area in a three-dimensional
space, and duration of a political regime as the interval in time from when a regime starts
(or enters the data-set) until it transition to different or similar regime, or is censored
(see operationalization in Section 3.2 and Figure 4.2). Alternatively, we can evaluate the
unit of analysis in the models as the change in the hazard/survival ratio of experiencing
the event of interest (regime transition) given a set of covariates. The unit of analysis
is therefore how the hazard/survival ratio changes over the available duration span of
political regimes.
All aspects of the research design; the data material, how the theoretical concepts are
operationalized and the methods used to estimate the effects, and test the hypotheses,
are described below.
3.1 Data
The statistical models use a variety of variables from a range of sources; the dependent
variable, the duration of political regimes, is a continuous positive number indicating the
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number of years a political regime have existed, and therefore use the same sources as the
operationalization of political regimes. The start and end point of a political regime follow
from the operationalization of political regimes which is described in detail below. The
measurement of political regimes, the SIP-index and the corresponding regime categories,
combines two data sources: the “Polyarchy” dataset by Vanhanen (2000) which originally
covers the time period 1810-1998, but have been updated to 2012, and several indicators
(see operationalization below) from the “Polity IV Project” (Marshall, Jaggers and Gurr,
2010). Corruption is gathered from the “Researcher’s Dataset” (part of “International
Country Risk Guide”) published by the PRS Group (2012). The dataset contain a range
of political variables such as corruption, law and order, military in politics, and more,
covering the time-period from 1984 to 2012.
The economic control variables are gathered from the data used Strand et al. (2012)
covering the period 1800-2008. This dataset is an extension of the “MIRPS” data used
in Gates et al. (2006). Two main sources are the starting point for the variables “GDP
per capita” and “GDP growth”: GDP data from “World Development Indicators” (World
Bank, 2012), “Expanded Trade and GDP Data” (Gleditsch, 2002) and “Historical Statis-
tics” economic data measured in 1990 International Geary-Khamis dollars (Maddison,
2010). The GDP per capita variable is interpolated and logarithmic transformed, while
economic growth is simply the annual difference in the logarithm of GDP per capita.1.
Data on natural resources rents as a percentage of GDP are taken from World Bank
(2012).
In order to motivate and test the theoretical assumptions concerning the effect of
corruption on events that promote civil unrest and political instability, I use data from
“Global Instances of Coups from 1950 to 2010” (Powell and Thyne, 2011), and several
variables from the Domestic Conflict Event Data (included in “Banks Cross-National
Time-Series Data Archive, 1815 - [2011]” (Banks, 2011)).
All in all, when combining the data sources the main analyses cover 135 countries
in the period 1984-2008 while the analyses of the intervening variables and theoretical
assumptions cover 1984-2007. For a complete list of countries included in the sample, see
Table A.1.
3.2 Operationalization of variables
This section takes a closer look at how the indices and indicators from the data sources are
operationalized. The dependent variable, main independent variables, control variables
and intervening variables are defined and discussed in turn.
1The methodology behind the economic variables are more thoroughly explained in Strand et al.
(2012, p.20)
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3.2.1 Dependent variable: regime duration
Each political regime in the dataset is uniquely identified by a duration interval (in years)
from when they originate to when they end. The duration of a political regime is the time-
interval between two regime changes. Some political regimes last the entire time-span of
the dataset, meaning that they never experience any regime changes. Those cases are right
censored in the survival analyses (discussed further below). The dependent variable in any
survival analysis with time varying covariates consists of three terms: (1) a start variable
indicating the time of origin for a political regime, (2) a stop variable indicating when a
political regime ends (e.g. changes/transitions), and (3) a binary censoring variable. The
censoring variable is coded for every consequtive year of duration.
If a political regime experiences a regime transition during a particular year the po-
litical regime ends and the censoring variable is coded 1. If a political regime experiences
a regime transition during a particular year that political regime ends, and the censor-
ing variable is coded 1. Hence, the number of ones on the censoring variable equals the
number of regime changes within the time-frame of the analysis. If a political regime is
still ongoing by the final year of the analysis, 2008, the censoring variable is also coded
0. This is an important feature of survival analysis; those units that never end, or still
ongoing at the end of the analysis, are used in order to estimate the models even though
the actual duration interval is unobserved.
The time varying covariates (i.e. the independent variables and control variables)
covers different time periods. The combination of coverage on the corruption index and
the duration of regimes limit the time frame of the analyses to 1984-2008. As well
as censoring at the end of the analyses (those regimes that are ongoing in 2008), the
political regimes enter the dataset in 1984 with a predetermined duration. The analyses
are therefore right-censored and left truncated. The number of years prior to 1984 are
observed, but not modeled directly due to the time frame on the independent covariates.
Figure 3.1 visualize regime duration and right censoring for the political regimes in USA,
Bangladesh and Russia during the period. The cases are selected in order to visualize
different examples of how cases and political regimes are coded. The first, USA, is
the easiest. It enters the dataset in 1984 with a predetermined duration, and does not
experience any regime changes during the period 1984-2008 (and thereby censored in
2008). Bangladesh, on the other hand, experiences three changes in the political regime
during the period (each change/event indicated by the black dots on the dashed line). In
1991 there was a change in political regime from autocracy to democracy. The democratic
regime was reverted to autocracy 2006 before breaking down again in 2008. This means
that the entire duration of the political regime is observed. Similarly, Russia is coded with
three distinct political regimes in the period. The comparison of Russia and Bangladesh













Figure 3.1: Examples of regime duration and right censoring: political regimes in USA,
Bangladesh and Russia, 1984-2008. Political regimes are right censored in 2008 if ongoing
by the end of that year. Each regime enters the dataset with the number of years they
have endured prior to 1984. In effect this is left truncation.
illustrates the concept of right censoring. Russia does not experience a regime change in
2008, and are therefore censored.
In sum, three variables with information concerning the duration of political regimes
are used. One measuring when the polity starts or enters the dataset (start), one when
it ends (stop), and one indicating whether the political regime is still in existence at the
end of a given year (status.time).
A change in political regime is operationalized in accordance with the definition of
political regimes (see below). In general a regime change is coded in accordance with a
predefined threshold of necessary changes in the sub indicators. There is no consensus
concerning these necessary thresholds, as there are no overall consensus on the defining
properties of political regimes. These different thresholds are discussed in further detail
below, as this is of central importance to the theme of the thesis as well as the results
derived from the analyses. Once the definition of regime change is in place, the general
definition of regime duration follows as the interval between two regime changes, if any.
The data in the model are left-truncated which means that some of the political
regimes have endured a predetermined number of years before entering the dataset in
1984. This is called “delayed entry” (Jenkins, 2005, p.74), and simply means that the
survival of political regimes must be conditioned on prior duration. This is done by
starting the counting process with the number of years survived prior to 1984 (Jenkins,
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2005, p.74).
3.2.2 Main explanatory variables
The main explanatory variables political regimes and corruption, and the interaction
term linking them, allow me to test the hypothesis presented in Section 2.4. I address the
measurement of these variables in turn, and try to build a bridge between the theoretical
concepts and choice of empirical representations.
Corruption. The International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) corruption index is
a subjective six-point expert coded index based on available political and economical
data (PRS Group, 2012, p.4-5). In order to make the interpretation of the results more
intuitive, I have turned the original values of the index so that low values on the index
represent a low degree of corruption, and high values a high degree of corruption. The
different levels of the corruption index are based on the following list of sub indicators
(PRS Group, 2012, p.4-5):
“... actual or potential corruption in the form of excessive patronage, nepotism,
job reservations, ’favor-for-favors’, secret party funding, and suspiciously close ties
between politics and business.”
The sub indicators of corruption mentioned above are all related to a private use of
public goods, and it is the consequences of such forms of corruption that is hypothesized
to influence political institutions through “popular discontent, unrealistic and inefficient
controls on the state economy, and encourage the development of the black market” (PRS
Group, 2012, p.4-5).
Time-series data on corruption are in general weak. The most popular one, for ex-
ample, the Transparency International’s “Corruption Perception Index”, is not consistent
over time. It would not be possible to use this index to analyse the effect of corruption
on regime duration since it would not be clear what the values on the index means from
one year to another. The results could hence be biased and misleading. (Treisman, 2007)
Political Regimes. Since this thesis replicate and build upon an existing operational-
ization and conceptualization of political regimes, the measurement of political regimes
used in this thesis are the same as used in Gates et al. (2006, p.897-898). The three
conceptual dimensions (executive recruitment, executive constraints and participation)
are summarized into the “Scalar Index of Polities” (SIP). The ideal types of democracy,
autocracy and inconsistent regimes are derived from the SIP-index2; the three conceptual
dimensions make up a three-dimensional space (for empirical visualization see Figure
2The index is the average score on the three dimensions ranging from zero to one, where one equals
perfect democracy; when score is close to zero a political regime is defined as autocratic.
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4.2) where the distance to the corners (ideal democracy or autocracy) meaning either
zero (autocratic) on all dimensions, or one (democratic) on all dimensions. The regime
categorizes is therefore simply democratic if a political regime is closer to the democratic
ideal types than the autocratic corner or the center of the conceptual space (inconsistent)
(Gates et al., 2006, p.898). The regime categorization is therefore defined according to
the distance to either one of the ideal types; if closer to one than any of the other then
the political regime is defined according to that particular ideal type.
The operationalizations of the constitutive dimensions of political regimes are based
on several sub indicators. The executive recruitment dimension3 uses three variables from
the Polity IV dataset. Executive constraints is operationalized using the “Decisions Con-
straints on the Chief Executive” (XCONST), also from the Polity dataset. Participation
is operationalized using democratic participation (total votes in election divided by the
total population) and competition (total number of votes to the minority parties) from
the “Polyarchy”4 dataset by Vanhanen (2000). In the case of a successful coup follow-
ing an election, both indicators are coded zero. In addition, if the level of participation
exeeds 70 %, participation is multiplied by competition divided by 30 % in order to ac-
curately measure “the extent to which an election has a decisive impact on the selection
of executive...” (Gates et al., 2006, p.898). The natural logarith of this number is the
participation dimension.
In addition to using the original operationalization as Gates et al. (2006, p.897-898), I
also test some alternative operationalization of similar nature. First of all, the indicators
mentioned above are aggregated into the SIP-index ranging from zero to one (perfect
democracy score).5 Following the threshold used in Hegre and Fjelde (2011, p.14) the
SIP-index is recoded accordingly: if below or equal .15 a polity is defined as autocrat-
ic/authoritarian. If above .80 a polity is defined as democratic. If in-between a polity
is inconsistent or semi-democratic. The main difference between this operationalization
and the original is that “Caesaristic” regime types are included in the autocratic ideal
type.
Change in political regime. A change in the current political regime can occur by
change of ideal type (institutions are altered so that the distance to another ideal type in
the three-dimensional space is closer), or a change in the one of the sub indicators of each
dimension so that institutional design of the political regime is substantially different,
but still within the same ideal type. More specifically, any of the following events leads
3“Regulation of Chief Executive Recruitment”(XRREG),“Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment”
(XRCOMP) and “Openness of Executive Recruitment” (XROPEN) (Gates et al., 2006, p.897; Marshall,
Jaggers and Gurr 2010)
4The dataset originally span from 1810 to 1998, but have been updated to 2012 based on the instruc-
tion in Vanhanen (1998) dataset and Vanhanen (2000)
5SIP equals xconst+xrec+part3 normalized to range between 0 and 1. For further information see Strand
(2006, p.4)
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to a regime change (as defined as (Gates et al., 2006, p.898)):
“(1) a movement from one category to another in the Executive dimension (i.e.,
between ascription/designation, dual ascription/elective, and elective, (2) a change
of at least two units in the Executive Constraints dimension, or (3) a 100% increase
or 50% decrease in the Participation dimension (in the log-transformed variable,
this is a change of 0.69 in either direction from the original level)”.
The duration of political regimes is thus the number of years from one change in
political regimes to another. The next chapter discusses more specifically how the choice
of operationalization affects the number of regime changes and the duration of political
regimes. In order to test the robustness of the results, I compare the results of using
the original operationalization in Gates et al. (2006) using two operationalizations from
Polity IV (Marshall, Jaggers and Gurr, 2010) in addition to the categorization based on
thresholds on the SIP-index.
Alternative operationalizations. Since the operationalizations presented so far
use several Polity IV indicators, I also include the Polity index in the analysis exploring
the effect of alternative operationalizations on the main results (see Section 5.3). The
Polity scale of polities is the composite measure of several sub indicators6 aggregated into
two dimensions scoring the degree of autocracy and democracy on a scale from 0 to 10.
These two combined creates an continuum going from -10 (autocratic) to 10 (democratic).
In order to compare this directly with MIRPS/SIP I have recoded the scale into similar
regime categories: democratic if scoring above 5, autocratic if below 5, and inconsistent
if in between these two values.
While the MIRPS operationalization and the polity definition of political regimes
are different, the former use several of the indicators in the latter. The combination of
indicators and the weights assigned differs between the two conceptualizations and op-
erationalizations of political regimes. The polity index do not include the actual degree
of participation and competition, but instead categorize the regulation and competive-
ness of participation into ten categories from “suppressed” to “Institutionalized Electoral”
(Marshall, Jaggers and Gurr, 2010, p.28).For a complete overview of the indicators and
weights that constitute the polity index see Marshall, Jaggers and Gurr (2010, p.13-18)
In order to use the categorical ideal types of political regimes similar to the main models
presented in Table 5.2 I have recoded the polity scale into categorical political regimes.7
The MIRPS and the SIP-index correspond on the levels of change needed in the sub
indicators needed for a change in the political regime. The Polity IV duration dataset
6See Marshall, Jaggers and Gurr (2010, p.16) for a complete list of indicators included in the Polity
IV operationalization of political regimes.
7Following I recode the original scale, going from -10 (strongly autocratic) to +10 (strongly demo-
cratic), into autocratic if the score is below 5, democratic if above 5 and inconsistent if in between -6
and 6.
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on political regimes use two different measures of regime changes. The first one code any
change in the Polity scale as a regime change, and the second code a 3-point change in the
scale as a regime change. The implications of these coding choices are discussed further in
the next two chapters. The main motivation for using more than one definition of political
regimes follow from lack of consensus regarding conceptualization and operationalization
in the literature in general, and the fact that this choice obviously influences the duration
of political regimes (and thereby also the results).
Since the theoretical concept and empirical operationalization of winning coalition
and selectorate size rely on several Polity IV indicators similar to the MIRPS/SIP opera-
tionalization, the W/S ratio does not change within the duration of the political regimes
used in the dataset. In other words, we are not missing any changes in the composition
of the winning coalition of the selectorate by using alternative indices, and likewise, the
number of regime changes is equal to the number derived from using any change in the
Polity IV scale as a regime change. Indices of political regimes and the W/S-ratio are
furthest apart when on intermediate levels of democracy or autocracy (i.e. inconsistent
regimes). They also deviate in cases like the former Soviet Union and other autocratic
regimes that have some democratic traits (e.g. elections). The original MIRPS opera-
tionalization of political regimes excludes many of the regimes labeled “Caesaristic” (e.g.
Cuba), and inconsistent regimes are used as the reference category leading to an esti-
mate only for the political regimes that are the most comparable in terms of the W/S
relationship and MIRPS.
The theoretical framework presented applies a somewhat different conceptualization
and operationalization of political regimes arguing that “ ”. However, in the opera-
tionalization used by Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003, p.133-140). I argue that there
is an adequate degree of overlap between the operationalization of the ratio between
winning coalition and selectorate size (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003, p.133-140), the
MIRPS/SIP (Gates et al., 2006, p.897-898) and the Polity IV operationalization (Mar-
shall, Jaggers and Gurr, 2010) that the operationalization of choice does not prevent the
empirical model from testing the hypothesis in Section 2.4. Their variable operational-
izing the size of the winning coalition uses a combination of regime types from Banks
(1996), and several Polity IV indicators (Marshall, Jaggers and Gurr, 2010) (XRCOMP,
XROPEN, PARCOMP) as a composed measure of “...whether the regime is civil or mili-
tary, the openness and competition of the executive recruitment, and the competitiveness
of participation” ranging from zero to one (largest) (Teorell et al., 2011, p.31-32). The
operationalization of the selectorate size based on the “LEGSELECT” variable from the
Polity dataset which measures the degree of the “breadth of selectiveness of the members
of each country’s legislature (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003, p.134).
The conceptual and operational separation between the selectorate theory and the
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conceptual definition in Gates et al. (2006) are therefore mostly due to the fact that
the degree of executive constraints (XCONST) is not included in the selectorate theory
measurement of political institutions.8 Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003, p.139) write that
“[o]ur measure of W does not use the XCONST variable and so taps into dimensions of
the nature of political competition that the commonly used measures of democracy do not
utilize”; there are obviously advantages and disadvantages with this choice, and because
the constraint on the executive is of theoretical importance when evaluating the effect of
corruption on institutional duration, I benefit more from utilizing a definition of political
regimes that include this dimension than excluding it from the analysis altogether.
To summarize, even though there are some discrepancies between the empirical op-
erationalization used in this thesis, and the operationalization presented in Bueno de
Mesquita et al. (2003, p.133-140), four elements legitimize the use of the Gates et al.
(2006, p.897-898) to investigate theoretical properties derived from the selectorate the-
ory: (1) there is a high correlation among the two operationalizations (0.82 from 1984 to
2000 between W/S-ratio and MIRPS), (2) autocratic and democratic regimes correspond
to a low and high ratio score (the loyalty norm), respectively, (3) several sub indicators
are shared by the two meaning that regime changes overlaps, and (4) the least compatible
cases are either used as a reference category or excluded from the main operationalization
in Gates et al. (2006, p.897-898).
3.2.3 Control variables
The explanatory variables, and the interaction between them, are the main extension
to the original model which is replicated (“Model 2 1900-2000” in Gates et al. (2006,
p.901)). Therefore, the control variables closely resemble the variables used original
analysis. However, I add one control variable to the original model, natural resources
rents, which is a central factor in the theoretical framework that alters the strategic
landscape and prospects of regime duration. The operationalization of the relevant control
variables are listed below.
GDP per capita. A log-transformed variable measuring the constant-dollar GDP
per capita level of a country (Strand et al., 2012, p.20). The measurement is an updated
and modified version of the GDP variable used in Gates et al. (2006, p.899). The variable
is lagged by one year and interpolated to account for missing values using three sources
(Strand et al., 2012, p.20): “Historical Statistics” (Maddison, 2010), “World Development
Indicators” (World Bank, 2011), and“Expanded Trade and GDP Data”(Gleditsch, 2002).
8The correlation between W/S and SIP in the time period 1984-2000 is 0.87 (correlation matrix be-
tween all oparationalizations can be found in Table X in Appendix A). In other words, there is a positive
relationship between high values (read democracy) on the W/S-ratio and the SIP-index (0.87*0.87=69%
shared variance)
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GDP per capita squared. Gates et al. (2006, p.901-902) find a curvilinear rela-
tionship between GDP per capita and the duration of political regimes. I test using a
squared GDP per capita term, but remove this term from the main model output as the
effect is insignificant during the period.
GDP growth. The annual difference in the lagged GDP per capita as defined above.
In order to report the difference in growth rate as a percentage difference between two
years, I have first taken the exponential of the logged GDP per capita variable, and
thereafter subtracted the values in t−1 from the values in t divided by the values in t−1,
multiplied by 100 (GDP growth = GDPt−GDPt−1GDPt−1
∗ 100). Finally, the growth variable is
lagged by one year.
Natural resources. A dichotomous variable created based on the World Bank’s
“Total natural resources rents (% of GDP)”. The variable is a percentage of the “...sum
of oil rents, natural gas rents, coal rents (hard and soft), mineral rents, and forest rents”.
This variable is therefore suitable for capturing the concept of free resources or unearned
income presented in Smith (2008, p.), which is expected to increase the .... The variable
is given the value 1 if the percentage of natural resources rents are higher or equal to 33
percent of GDP, and 0 otherwise similar to the operationalization of oil export used in
Fearon and Laitin (2003, p.81) and Hegre and Fjelde (2011, p.15). Countries that rely
heavily on oil export “tend to have weaker state apparatuses than one would expect given
their level of income because the rulers have less need for a socially intrusive and elaborate
bureaucratic system to raise revenue...” Fearon and Laitin (2003, p.81). I directly extend,
through Smith (2008, p.781), this argument to include other forms of natural resources,
thereby assessing the impact of the concept often referred to as the “resource curse”.
Political neighborhood. Strand et al. (2012, p.21) define this variable (lagged by
one year) as “[t]he difference between the country’s SIP value and the average SIP in
the country’s immediate neighborhood”. Neighboring countries are defined according to
the contiguity coding in Stinnett et al. (2002, p.61-63); they distinguish between five
categories of contiguity (one for land and four for water), where land contiguity is defined
as countries separated by land or river border. The political neighborhood variable only
consider cases separeted by land or river borders (contiguity equals one). The theoretical
and empirical literature on regime duration emphasizes the diffusion effect of political
institutions. Political neighborhood is included in the model to control for this effect.
REFERANCE Gleditch on use of immidiate neighborhood.
First Polity in Country. A binary variable coded 1 if the current political regime is
the first regime in that country. The main expectation is that political regimes in newly
formed countries are comparatively less stable: “[i]n newly independent countries most
institutions are embryonic, not just the institutions regulating executive recruitment,
executive constraints, and participation” (Gates et al., 2006, p.900).
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3.2.4 Intervening variables
In Section 4.2 below I assess the impact of corruption on events linked to civil unrest,
political instability and potential changes in political regimes. The variables operational-
ized below are used as as binary dependent variables, and the variables described above
as covariates. In addition, I add a variable with the total number of years a political
regime has lasted to the models.
Coups. A coup or coup attempt may not necessarily lead to change in the political
regime, but yields insights into the nature of the political opposition and how well the
ruling regime strategically allocate resources in order to decrease political discomfort
among societal groups with different institutional preferences. The variable coups is a
dichotomous variable indicating whether there has been at least one coup (coded 1) that
particular year (successful or not) (Powell and Thyne, 2011, p.252). If there has not been
any coups or coup attempts the variable is coded 0.
Riots. “Any violent demonstration or clash of more than 100 citizens involving the
use of physical force” (Banks, 2008, p.11). If one or more riots occurred within a year the
variable is coded 1, otherwise 0.
Revolutions. “Any illegal or forced change in the top government elite, any attempt
at such a change, or any successful or unsuccessful armed rebellion whose aim is inde-
pendence from the central government” (Banks, 2008, p.11). This variable is coded 1
regardless of the frequency of occurrences, otherwise 0.
Demonstrations. “Any peaceful public gathering of at least 100 people for the
primary purpose of displaying or voicing their opposition to government policies or au-
thority, excluding demonstrations of a distinctly anti-foreign nature” (Banks, 2008, p.12).
This variable have been recoded into a binary variable (1 if at least one demonstration,
otherwise 0).
Government Crisis. This variable count the number of major governmental crisis
occurring a particular year defined as “[a]ny rapidly developing situation that threatens
to bring the downfall of the present regime - excluding situations of revolt aimed at
such overthrow” (Banks, 2008, p.11). I have dichotomized this variable (1 if at least one
government crisis, otherwise 0).
3.3 Statistical methods
I use two different methods in order to test the theoretical propositions presented in Sec-
tion 2.4. First, I use logistic regression in order to analyse whether corruption increases
the chances of coup attempts, riots, revolution attempts, demonstrations and major gov-
ernment crisis (i.e. the intervening variables) as presented in Hypothesis 1. Second, in
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order to test the main propositions presented in Hypothesis 2 and 3 concerning the con-
ditional effect of corruption and political regimes on the duration of political regimes, I
use several survival models. From a methodological point of view using a survival models
is the best method of modelling the duration of political regimes. We are able to account
for censored information in the dataset; the data used in this thesis is both left- and
right censored. Some of the observations are unobserved prior to the first observation
point in the dataset. The data is also right-censored, meaning that some duration-spells
have not ended before the last observation-point in the dataset (Mills, 2011, p.5-6; Box-
Steffensmeier and Jones 2005, p.16-18).
Logistic regression. The intervening variables are all binary, distinguishing between
the value 0 (no event) and 1 (event). I therefore make use of several binary logistic
regression models specified the nonlinear relationship between the covariates and the
probability of an event:
Pr(yi = 1|xi) = exp(βxi)
1 + exp(βxi)
(3.1)
where the probability of any of the events, yi = 1, given the vector of covariates
and parameters, xi and β, are attained by exponentiation of the log odds divided by 1
plus the log of the odds (Long, 1997, p.51). The logistic regression model, as specified
here, describe the expected (average value) on the binary variable, yi, given values on the
covariates xi. The transformation from absolute values on the covariates to the estimates
are mainly the result of three steps: (1) calculate the proportion of units experiencing an
event given certain characteristics (e.g. how many democratic regimes that experience
revolution attempts compared to inconsistent regimes), (2) calculate the odds of that
event based on the proportion with and without a particular value on the covariates
(odds = prop
1−prop), and (3) thereafter looking at the changes in odds ratio (OR) given a
unit change in the covariates (OR = odds(x+1)
odds(x)
) (Long, 1997, p.79-82). While the odds
reflect the changes in proportion and probability of an event, yi = 1, between two values
on a covariate, represented in xi, the OR reflect the relative change in odds between two
outcomes on any of the covariates. The last step, attaining the OR from the regression
estimates, is the same as taking the exponential of the coefficient (the change in log odds)
as shown in equation (3.1). The interpretation of the results are described in more detail
below when compared to the estimates from the cox proportional hazard model, which
has a similar interpretation.
Survival analysis. The main purpose of survival analysis (or “Event History Mod-
eling”) is to evaluate time-to-event data or transition data (also referred to as survival
time data or duration data) (Jenkins, 2005, p.1). The objective is to distinguish between
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different states9. Box-Steffensmeier and Jones (2005, p.2-5) summarize well when they
write that survival models are most frequently and best used when: (1) we are interested
in the duration of events, (2) when events have a clear start and end point, (3) we wish
to study how the risk of an event occurring is changing over time, (4) want to study the
duration of events using panel data.
Survival analysis deal with conditional risk probability, meaning that events are con-
ditional on their history (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 2005, p.14-15). The hazard rate
describe the risk of experiencing an event in t conditional upon the duration up until that
point in time. The building block of the hazard rate are the relationship between the slope
of the failure function, f(t), and the survivor function, S(t), and is written h(t) = f(t)
S(t)
(Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 2005, p.13-14; Jenkins 2005, p.14-15). It follows from this
property that any change in a random variable, ∆t, is conditional upon survival until t.
To summarize with a relevant example, f(t) is the probability that a political regime will
fail (transition), S(t) is the proportion of regimes surviving beyond a point in time. The
h(t) is the probability of regime ending in at a particular point in time given the fact that
it have survived up to t. The hazard rate describe the relatioship between the probability
of failing conditional upon survival for a given set of units.
Cox proportional hazard model. The specification of the failure function, the
survival functions and hazard rate above does not include the potential differences among
characteristics (covariates). In addition to changes in the hazard rate over time, I am also
interested in how a set of covariates of theoretical importance influence the duration of a
political regime. A survival model with a predefined baseline hazard function (the effect
of time shared by all political regimes) and a set of covariates (varies among political
regimes) can therefore be written as a linear log-hazard model (Fox, 2008, p.2), but the
Cox-model does not specify the baseline hazard function, h0(t), and does therefore not
have an intercept (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 2005, p.49). The Cox regression model
is specified as following:
hi(t|xi) = exp(βxi)h0(t) (3.2)
where the change in the hazard ratio at any given point in time and level one the
covariate vector, hi(t|xi), is proportional by assumption. Similar to when we attain the
change in odds between levels of the covariates, xi, from exponentiation of the linear
log odds in a logistic regression model, exponentiation of the log hazard in a cox model
yields the hazard ratio. The odds ratio and the hazard ratio have similar properties. The
hazard ratio compares the duration of units (political regimes) by different levels of the
9In this thesis the states are political regimes, but any defining property that can be measured by
its duration (e.g. tenure, marital status, welfare benefits, type of government, conflict) can be applied
(Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 2005, p.2-5)
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covariates, xi, and the ratio thereby represent change in the hazard rate between two or
more values on the covariates. The baseline hazard function, h0(t), is left unspecified,
and any change in the covariates values xi is interpreted as the exp(β) change in the
hazard ratio when all other covariates are held constant (Jenkins, 2005, p.30). Presenting
the results exponential yields the hazard ratio, which resembles odds ratios in logistic
regressions.
Since I am first and foremost interested in quantifying the factors influencing the
survival I report the inverse of the hazard ratio, exp(−β), which I label the survival ratio.
Scores above 1 on the survival ratio is interpreted directly as a percentage increase in the
survival ratio. If the survival ratio equals 2, there is a 100 % reduction in likelihood
of regime transitions. If the ratio is 0.5, the scores above one can be interpreted as a
percentage reduction in the survival ratio after dividing 1 with the ratio (1/0.5). This
yields a score of 2 which equals a 100 % reduction in the survival ratio.
Chapter 4
Corruption and political instability
This chapter consists of two main parts: (1) descriptive statistics, and (2) preliminary
analyses of the relationship between corruption and the events increasing political insta-
bility and civil unrest according to the theoretical framework. The descriptive statistics
and the preliminary analyses set the stage for the main survival analyses presented in the
next chapter. The empirical test of the theoretical propositions is therefore twofold: (1)
does corruption increase the likelihood of politically destabilizing events, and if so, (2)
does corruption affect the duration of political regimes?
The preliminary analyses indicate that corruption increases the chances of experienc-
ing all events except riots. As a first stage towards evaluating the effect of corruption
on the duration of political regimes, the proposition put forth in Hypothesis 1, that cor-
ruption increases the likelihood of all the above mentioned events, is confirmed with the
exception of riots. The next chapter tests the ability of different political regimes to
overcome such events of political instability and civil unrest (whether corruption also
influences the duration of political regimes).
4.1 Descriptives
Following Jenkins (2005, p.45) I derive information about the survival ratio of political
regimes given different levels of corruption by answering three questions: (1) how long
are duration spells on average, (2) how does the covariates influence the duration lengths,
(3) and what is the shape of the baseline hazard function? In this section I answer the
first question, and other empirical relationships between the core variables in the model.
When presenting and interpreting the results in the next chapter I answer the second and
third question.
Table 4.1 gives a summary of the central tendency in the continuous variables men-
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tioned above.1 The average score (mean) and the standard deviation (sd) of the mean
are reported in the first two columns. The average duration span of almost 25 years for
all countries in the sample includes duration prior to 1984 (1900-2008). The standard
deviation of approximately 26 years means that there is a high degree of dispersion among
the duration of political regimes. The aberration of 26 years tells us that the data are
spread out over a large range of duration values, and that the typical unit has a average
distance of 26 year from the average value. The min and max show the range of the
lowest and highest observed score on the variables. The lowest number of years a regime
have endured, 0, simply means that that there have been political regimes that have not
lasted a full year before being overthrown or purged. There are several examples of coun-
tries with political regimes lasting less than a year: Algeria (in 1992 and 1995), Haiti (in
1994,1995,2004 and 2006), Liberia (in 1990 and 2003), Thailand (in 1991, 2006 and 2008)
and Zambia in 2008. The highest number of observed duration years is Oman which have
lasted 192 years. Oman is a consistent autocratic regime (absolutist monarchy) which
have had a score of zero on the SIP-index (perfect autocracy) in the time period 1984 to
2008. Supplementing the descriptive statistics for the duration span of political regimes
in Table 4.1 it is worthwhile to note the variation in average duration among political
regimes; autocracies last 30.87 years on average, inconsistent 9.48 years, and democracies
34.93 years when taking prior 1984 duration into account. All else equal, we can expect
democracies in the sample to last longer than autocracies and inconsistent regimes.
With the exception of natural resorces rents which is recoded to a binary variable given
the value 1 if above on third of total GDP2, the control variables enters the model as
they are presented in Table 4.1. The column “missing” in Table 4.1 report the number of
missing observations compared to the total number of country year observations (3767)
between 1984 and 2008. Three variables mainly lead to a loss of observations in the
analysis below due to listwise deletion: the SIP-index, the corruption index and the level
of natural resources rents. The critical consequence of the degree of missing values is
the fact that several events are lost due to missing values on the main covariates that
particular year (year of regime transition).
Figure 4.1 supplements the descriptive statistics by showing the changes in corruption
(annual average score) over the available time-span for each of the political regimes and
in total (left plot in Figure 4.1). While autocratic and semi-democratic regimes follow
a similar path, democratic regimes have an overall lower level of corruption. This is
consistent with the theoretical expectation; large winning coalition political systems (e.g,
democracies) are expected to have a lower degree of corruption than political regimes
1Table A.1 lists the countries included in Table 4.1, as well as the analyses presented below.
2Iraq had a score above 100 percent in 2001 and 2005. The original scale of the variable is included
to show the central tendencies amoung countries.
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Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics of continuous variables used in the main models, 1984-
2008
mean sd min max missing
Duration (Years) 24.37 26.29 0 192 0/3735
SIP 0.57 0.36 0 0.98 275/3735
Corruption 3.01 1.35 0 6 184/3735
log(GDP per capita) 8.22 1.15 5.33 10.99 38/3735
GDP growth (%) 1.24 6.08 -61.49 45.45 56/3735
Natural resources (% of GDP) 9.4 14.39 0 107.09 218/3735
Neighborhood SIP 0.54 0.29 0 0.97 25/3735
with smaller winning coalitions (e.g. autocracies). However, it is surprising that the
average level of corruption is increasing in within democracies. Some of this trend might
be explained by methodological changes made to the index (Treisman, 2007, p.220-221).
In the top right plot we see the bivariate relationship between scores on the corruption
index and SIP-index. There is a correspondence between low levels on the SIP-index and
high scores on the corruption. In other words, autocratic regimes are likely to be more
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Figure 4.1: Descriptive plots 1984-2008. The left plot report the annual average corrup-
tion score for political regimes 1984-2008. The plot on the right hand side is a scatterplot
of the relationship between levels on the SIP-index (y-axis) and corruption (x-axis)
Gates et al. (2006) categorize political regimes according to three main dimension:
executive recruitment, executive constraint and participation. Figure 4.23 is an empirical
assessment of the conceptual framework. All country year observations 1984-2008 are
plotted within the three dimensional operationalization of political regimes. This plot
3Note that there has been added jitter to the points in the plot in order to better visualize the variance.
This means that the score on the axes in Figure 4.2 does not precisely represent the actual score on that
dimension.
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gives an overview of the variance on the sub-indicators (as described in the previous
chapter) that corresponds to each ideal type of political regimes. As mentioned earlier,
regimes scoring 1 on the executive recruitment dimension (the “XRREC” indicator from
Polity IV) are political regimes where the “[c]hanges in chief executive occur through
forceful seizures of power” Marshall, Jaggers and Gurr (2010, p.21). These political
regimes are removed from the main analyses when using the original operationalization
of political regimes found in Gates et al. (2006, p.897-898). The x-axis highlights the
importance of executive constraints as a defining feature of political regimes. There are
no autocratic regime with a score above 4 on the executive constraints dimension, and
no democracy with a score below 4. Inconsistent regimes, on the other hand, cover the
range of the executive constraints dimension. In general, autocratic regimes score low
on the participation index, low on the executive recruitment, meaning that selection of
the chief executive are “chosen by designation within the political elite, without formal
competition”, and low on the executive constraints dimension. As of Figure 4.2, we see
that democracies have the opposite set of traits compared to autocratic regimes, and that
inconsistent regimes vary across all three dimensions.
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 4.2: Empirical visualization of cases within the Gates et al. (2006, p.896) con-
ceptualization of political regimes, 1984-2008. Ideal autocracy in the lower front left
corner and ideal democracy in the upper back right corner. Points in dark grey color
represent autocratic regimes, points in light grey inconsistent regimes and points in black
democratic regimes.
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Regime changes. Table 4.2 report the regime specific and total number of regime
transitions from 1984 to 2008. The late 1980s and early 1990s have the highest number
of political regimes changing, where most occurrences (30 in total) found place in 1992
in the aftermath of the fall of the Soviet Union, according to the operationalization in
Gates et al. (2006). As we see from Table 4.2 the number of regime changes are highly
influenced by the choice of operationalization.4. In the main operationalization, and
the SIP-operationalization with extended coverage, autocratic regimes have over twice
as many regime changes as democracies. However, using “Persist”5 from Polity IV as
operationalization, political regimes are approximetely equally prone to regime changes
in the period. The second operationalization of regime changes, “Durable”6 from Polity
IV, autocracies experience over twice as many as democracies, but less than inconsistent
regimes. The purpose of Table 4.2 is to highlight the problematic aspect of measuring
regime types, and therefore also regime duration and change. The operationalization and
conceptual definitions underlining each operationalization of choice are the crucial input
that is likely to drive the results. Since there are discrepancies between the operational-
ization used to derive the main results and operationalizations of political regimes which
share several of the subcomponents used in the main operationalization, I perform some
robustness tests using all regime measurements in Table 4.2.
Table 4.2: Number of regime changes by type and operationalization, 1984-2008
MIRPS SIP Persist Durable
Inconsistent 134 175 104 75
Autocracy 74 95 108 64
Democracy 28 29 103 21
Sum 236 299 315 160
Figure 4.3 visualize the relationship between corruption and duration (in years) by
regime types. There is not a distinct trend in autocracies and inconsistent regimes, but
democracies with long duration spans tend to score low on the corruption index. The lower
the mean duration span of democracies the higher the corruption level. Democracies with
low levels of corruption tend to last longer than those with high levels of corruption on
average. However, Figure 4.3 only yield information concerning the correlation between
duration and corruption score. It does not specify whether corruption affects the duration
of democracies. Also, there is a high degree of uncertainty linked to this relationship as
4The number of regime changes in the second column (MIRPS) of Table 4.2 is the main operational-
ization used to estimate the main results in Section 5.2. The third (SIP), fourth (Persist) and fifth
(Durable) are alternative, but similar operationalizations used to evaluate the robustness of the results
in Section 5.3
5A change in any of the subindicators of the Polity-index are defined as a regime change.
6A change of at least 3 points on the Polity scale are labeled a regime change
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seen by the confidence intervals (dashed lines) around the estimated mean (solid line) in
Figure 4.3.
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Figure 4.3: The relationship between corruption and duration in years for autocratic
(left), inconsistent (middle) and democratic regimes (right), 1984-2008. Duration prior
to 1984 are included and some cases with long duration span are removed from the plots.
The lines on the scatterplots represent the estimated mean with 95 % confidence intervals
4.2 Corruption and destabilizing events
As a first step in direction of answering the research question, I test whether corruption
increases the chances of coup attempts, riots, revolution attempts, demonstrations and
major government crisis (Hypothesis 1). The results from this inquiry are a first step in the
direction of evaluating the effect of corruption on the duration of political regimes. The
relationship between corruption and the destabilizing events analyzes how the allocation
of resources affects political instability and civil unrest.
Table 4.3 below report five logistic models, one using each intervening variable (coups,
riots, revolutions, demonstrations and government crisis) as dependent variables, assess-
ing the relationship between corruption and events promoting civil unrest and political
instability. The results are presented in odds ratios where estimates significantly below
or above one represent a decrease or increase in the chances of experiencing the event
in question, respectively. According to Hypothesis 1, I expect corruption to increase the
chances of every event tested in Table 4.3. With the exception of riots, the results in
Table 4.3 support Hypothesis 1. A one unit increase in corruption yields a 1.62 increase
in the odds ratio (1.62 more likely to occur for every one unit change in corruption) of
experiencing coups or coup attempts (62 % increase in odds). Similarly, a one unit in-
crease in corruption correspond to a 32 % increase in odds of experiencing revolutions or
revolution attempts, 25 % increase in odds of experiencing anti-government demonstra-
tions, and a 25 % increase in odds of experiencing governmental crisis. In other words,
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with the exception of riots, corruption significantly increases the chances of experiencing
all events linked to civil unrest and political instability.
Table 4.3: Corruption and coups, government crisis, riots, revolutions and demonstra-
tions, 1984-2008
Coups Gov.Crisis Riots Revolutions Demonstrations
Autocracy 0.892 0.503** 0.803 0.794 0.769
(2.241,0.355) (0.904,0.28) (1.183,0.545) (1.212,0.52) (1.072,0.552)
Democracy 1.047 2.499*** 1.45** 2.05*** 1.515***
(2.32,0.472) (3.64,1.716) (1.996,1.053) (2.885,1.457) (1.97,1.164)
Corruption 1.617*** 1.248*** 1.094 1.317*** 1.245***
(2.225,1.175) (1.407,1.106) (1.22,0.981) (1.485,1.167) (1.358,1.141)
log(Duration years) 0.663*** 0.837** 0.847** 0.935 0.801***
(0.885,0.497) (0.997,0.702) (0.982,0.731) (1.101,0.794) (0.906,0.707)
log(GDP per capita, t-1) 0.888 1.089 0.834** 0.64*** 1.105
(1.282,0.616) (1.293,0.917) (0.96,0.724) (0.744,0.549) (1.245,0.98)
GDP Growth(t-1) 0.936** 0.939*** 0.976** 0.979* 0.981*
(0.986,0.888) (0.965,0.914) (0.999,0.954) (1.003,0.955) (1,0.962)
Natural Resources 0.604 0.544 0.863 1.123 0.46***
(2.682,0.136) (1.165,0.254) (1.457,0.511) (1.879,0.672) (0.754,0.281)
NeighboorSIP 0.563 1.28 0.649* 0.74 1.287
(2.171,0.146) (2.27,0.722) (1.068,0.394) (1.282,0.427) (1.929,0.858)
log-likelihood -189.83 -814.85 -977.77 -859.66 -1356.39
AIC 397.67 1647.69 1973.55 1737.31 2730.77
N 2567 2445 2444 2444 2445
Notes: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Estimates are reported in odds ratioes (exp(coef)).
95 percent confidence intervals in parentheses.
Unlike the survival models in Section 5.2 I do not report the interaction between
corruption and regime type, but these results can be found in Table A.2 in Appendix A.
With the exeption of demonstrations, none of the interaction terms between corruption
and political yield any significant results. In the case of demonstrations, both democracies
and autocracies have a lower odds when corruption is zero. For each increase in corruption
the odds ratio increases by 38 % in autocracies and 40 % in democracies. This do not
confund the main trend presented in Table 4.3; corruption increases the likelihood of every
type of event except riots. When it comes to demonstrations, autocracies and democracies
are less likely to experience demonstrations when corruption is low. For every increase in
corruption the likelihood of demonstrations increases. The direction of the effect is does
not change. Corruption increases the likelihood of demonstrations regardless of poltical
regime.
Figure 4.4 report the predicted probabilities of coups and government crisis for dif-
ferent levels of the corruption-index in the period 1984-2008. The plots show how the
predicted probabilities of each event changes when corruption is increased and the other
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covariates in the model are at their average values. The trend is more clearcut in the case
of corruption and government crises as the effect is stronger and the uncertainty lower
than the effect of corruption on coup attempts. The “rug” at the bottom of each plot in
Figure 4.4 denotes observations. There are few observations above 5 on the corruption
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Figure 4.4: Predicted probabilities of coups and government crises at different levels
of corruption, 1984-2008. All other covariates are held at their average values. 95 %
confidence intervals (dashed lines).
Similarly, Figure 4.5 report the positive relationship between corruption and the pre-
dicted probabilities of revolutions and demonstrations in the period 1984-2008. The effect
of corruption on the probability of there being a demonstration is the far largest among
the events reported in Table 4.3; when corruption is low, and the other covariates are at
their average, the risk of demonstrations are between 15-20 %. Increasing the corruption
score from minimum to maximum also doubles the probability of demonstrations. The
shape of the increase in predicted probability is linear like meaning that one unit increase
in corruption corresponds to around 7 % increase in the probability of demonstrations.
The predicted probability of experiencing revolutions or revolution attempts is over 20 %
when corruption is at maximum value (6) and all other covariates at their average values.
The results so far indicate that corruption influences events that threaten the existing
political regime in line with the theoretical expectations. However, these results alone
are not directly linked to the duration of political regimes. Even though corruption
increases the chances of coups, government crises, revolutions, and demonstrations it is
not certain that these events leads to a breakdown of the current regime. Political regimes
are different strategic environments that determine the possibilities to prevent events
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Figure 4.5: Predicted probabilities of revolutions and demonstrations at different levels
of corruption, 1984-2008. All other covariates are held at their average values. 95 %
confidence intervals (dashed lines).
investigated above from escalating to a regime change. In addition, successful coups and
revolutions may not lead to changes in the political regime as agents overthrowing the
current regime will find themselves in the same incentive structure as the leadership they
replace. It is also noteworthy that the ability and purpose of the events analyzed can be
different across regime types. The degree of public goods in democracies makes protest
easily available strategy of expressing discontent with the regime. Whether the protest
targets the regime or particular policies by the leadership is uncertain. In autocracies,
protest against the current regime comes at a greater cost for the participants as autocratic
regimes have greater oppressive and repressive means at their disposal. In the next chapter
I turn to test whether corruption in interaction with formal properties of political regimes
affect the duration of political regimes in the time period 1984 to 2008.
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Chapter 5
Corruption and regime duration
This section present the main results from the survival analyses of the duration of political
regimes based on a replication of “Model 2 1900-2000” in Gates et al. (2006, p.901). The
unit of analysis, regime definition, and several covariates are the same as in Gates et al.
(2006), where the main covariate, corruption, and the interaction between corruption and
political regimes stand as the main extension of their model. I present the results in a
step wise manner from replication to main results. First, I replicate “Model 2 1900-2000”
Gates et al. (2006, p.901), and discuss the main trends in institutional duration in the
20th century compared to the period 1984-2000.1. Furthermore, I compare their result
which is estimated using an “Accelerated Failure Time Model” with a log-logistic baseline
hazard function2 to a Cox proportional hazard model within the shorter time period.
The main results are presented below in Section 5.2 organized around the presenta-
tion and interpretation of the three models presented in Table 5.2 in accordance with the
hypotheses presented in Section 2.4. In order to assess whether the model with an interac-
tion terms between regime types and corruption increases the model fit, a model without
the interaction terms are included for comparison. This also enables an evaluation of the
unconditional effect of each constitutive term that is combined in the interaction terms.
5.1 Replication
The replication of “Model 2 1900-2000” in Gates et al. (2006, p.901) are found in Table
5.1. The models in Gates et al. (2006, p.901), and the first two models in Table 5.1, are
“Accelerated Failure Time models” (AFT) with a log-logistic baseline hazard function.
Additionally, their models estimates the number of days survived while my main results
1Due to the time frame of the replication dataset, I only subset the period from 1984-2000, but the
time frame is extended to 2008 in the main results (Section 5.2)
2A log-logistic baseline hazard function is an assumption concerning the survival of political regimes
when the covariates equals zero. A log-logistic specification of the baseline hazard function implies that
the inherit risk of regime change is proportionally larger in the first years of a new political regime.
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use number of years. Overall there are four differences between the models in Gates et al.
(2006, p.901) and the main models here (see Table 5.2): (1) estimated using similar but
different methods, (2) different time periods, (3) the duration is counted in number of
years rather than number of days3, and (4) one variable (“First Polity in Country”) is
removed while “Natural Resources” is added to the replication model. All estimates in
“Model 2 1900-2000” (Table 5.1) are entirely equal to the original results in Gates et al.
(2006, p.901). Autocracies and democracies are more stable than inconsistent regimes
(reference category). Economic development (curvilinear), economic growth and whether
the current political regime is the first in the country increases the expected survival
times of political regimes. Political regimes are less stable when the average distance to
neighboring political regimes on the SIP-index are increasing.
The “Gamma” value in bottom of Table 5.1 is the shape parameter that assesses
whether the probability distribution, log-logistic, deviates from a monotonic baseline
hazard (Gamma score of 1). A score significantly below one means that the conditional
survival based on the model is first deacreases then increases. The log-likelihood of the
model with a constant only (log-likelihood null) compared to the log-likelihood indicates
that the inclusion of the covariates increases the model fit. Furthermore, comparing the
number of failures between the first and second model in Table 5.1 shows that a great
proportion of the regime changes, 224 out of 555 in total between 1900-2000, occur during
the period 1984-2000.
The second model in Table 5.1 is the same model as “Model 2 1900-2000”, but with a
different time period. The most notable change in the results between these two models
are that autocratic regimes are not significantly more stable than inconsistent regimes
within this period. As we see from “Model 2 1900-2000” in Table 5.1 both autocratic
and democratic regimes are more stable than inconsistent regimes. This is not true for
autocratic regimes in the period 1984-2000 which indicate that the duration of political
regimes in the period of my main analysis deviate from the main findings in Gates et al.
(2006, p.901). The third model is a Cox proportional hazard model, where the results
are presented as survival ratios (exp−(β)). The estimates from the AFT models yield
information about the expected change in survival times, whereas the estimates Cox-
models yield information about the survival ratio. The results are interlinked, but not
entirely the same. I do not comment the differences in the estimates between the first and
third model any further as the results from the main model are presented and discussed
further in the next section.
3Since the covariates all have annual scores I measure duration in number of years instead of days
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Table 5.1: Replication “Model 2 1900-2000” in Gates et.al (2006, p.901)
Model 2 ICRG timeperiod Model 2 Cox
1900-2000 1984-2000 1984-2000
Autocracy/Kingdom 1.850∗∗∗ 1.136 0.979
[1.516,2.259] [0.815,1.583] [0.726,1.319]
Democracy 3.613∗∗∗ 4.948∗∗∗ 4.620∗∗∗
[2.709,4.820] [2.977,8.224] [2.807,7.602]
Economic Development 1.273∗∗∗ 1.224∗∗ 1.153∗
[1.167,1.388] [1.050,1.427] [1.007,1.321]
Economic Development² 1.160∗∗∗ 1.245∗∗∗ 1.126∗∗
[1.097,1.226] [1.137,1.363] [1.044,1.215]
GDP growth 1.018∗ 1.021 1.027∗∗
[1.002,1.035] [0.996,1.047] [1.008,1.046]
Political neighborhood 0.354∗∗∗ 0.477∗ 0.352∗∗
[0.216,0.579] [0.195,1.164] [0.175,0.707]








Observations 7018 2536 2536
Number of polities 716 377 377
Number of failures 555 224 224
ll 0 -985.686 -381.121 -996.059
ll -895.276 -337.336 -943.442
Estimates are reported in survival ratioes; 95% confidence intervals in brackets
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.0005
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5.2 Extending the model: main results
This section extend the result of the replication in Table 5.1 in order to analyze and test
the hypotheses concerning the conditional effect of corruption on the duration of political
regimes. I find some tentavive support of hypothesis 2. The effect of corruption on the
stability of political regimes depends on the regime type. Hypothesis 3 is supported by the
analyses, but note that there is a high degree of uncertainty associated with the estimates.
The survival ratio of democracies is negatively affected by the level of corruption. More
precisely, the democracies are more stable when corruption is low and decreasing for each
consecutive increase in corruption. This effect is significant (10 % level) across model
spesifications. Hypothesis 4 is not supported. The survival ratio of autocratic regimes is
not affected by the degree of corruption.
The transition from the last column of the Table 5.1 to the first column of Table
5.2 highlights the changes made to the original composition of variables in addition to
including corruption. “Natural Resources” is added, and “First Polity in Country” is
removed from the analyses. I remove “First Polity in Country” due to counter-intuitive
results, and thereby lack theoretical support. Excluding the variable from the analyses
does not influence the results.
Table 5.2 below compare the results from four Cox proportional hazard models. The
estimates for democracies and autocracies are compared to inconsistent regimes (reference
category) in all models. In the first model (“MIRPS”), being democratic significantly
increases the survival ratio. Democracies are almost seven times as stable as inconsistent
regimes. The higher the level of GDP growth the more likely a political regime is to
survive; a one percent increase in GDP growth increases the survival ratio with around 5
% percent. Having over 33 % of GDP from natural resources rents does not significantly
influence the likelihood of surviving. Being in a political neighborhood where neighboring
political regimes have different institutional frameworks reduces the survival ratio by
0.43 which is equivalent to a 130 % reduction in the survival ratio. Corruption does
not significantly influence the survival ratio of political regimes in this model. However,
this is not expected theoretically, as the main argument link the effect of corruption on
duration to the existing political regime.
To test hypotheses 3 and 4 – that corruption decreases the duration of democracies and
increases the duration of autocracies – I include an interaction term between the regime
types and corruption. The second model in Table 5.2 indicate support of Hypothesis
3; the constitutive term for democracies, which is the effect of democracy when the
conditioning variable (corruption) is zero (Brambor, 2005, p.74) suggest that cases with
this combination of values are far more durable than inconsistent regimes; the survival
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Table 5.2: Main results: the duration of political regimes, 1984-2008
MIRPS MIRPS(interaction) MIRPS(Frailty)
Autocracy 0.837 1.127 1.131
(0.591,1.185) (0.306,4.15) (0.349,3.658)
Democracy 6.971*** 21.096*** 21.181***
(4.243,11.453) (6.635,67.07) (5.35,83.856)
Corruption 1.047 1.133 1.134
(0.909,1.206) (0.947,1.356) (0.94,1.368)
log(GDP per capita, t-1) 1.154 1.163 1.165*
(0.963,1.383) (0.967,1.398) (0.985,1.377)
GDP Growth(t-1) 1.047*** 1.048*** 1.048***
(1.018,1.076) (1.019,1.077) (1.024,1.072)
Resources 0.86 0.848 0.847
(0.47,1.576) (0.462,1.555) (0.47,1.525)






log-likelihood null -882.03 -882.03 -882.03
log-likelihood -817.99 -816.39 -815.35
AIC 1649.98 1650.78 1650.34
N 2753 2753 2753
Number of events 197 197 197
Notes: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. 95 percent confidence intervals in parentheses.
Standard errors are clustered on country. Frailty: baseline hazard functions differ amoung countries.
Estimates are reported in survival ratioes.
ratio estimate of 21.1 means that democracies with the lowest degree of corruption are
over 21 times more likely to last longer than inconsistent regimes with the same degree
of corruption. Furthermore, the interaction term between democracy and corruption
indicates that for every consecutive increase in corruption, the surival ratio is reduced by
43 %.
A democracy that have survived until a speisific point in time will have a greater
chances of surviving until the next point in time when corruption is low. An increase in
corruption decreases the chances of surviving until the next point in time, but regardless
of corruption level the chances of survival are always greater in democracies than in incon-
sistent regimes. In terms of the difference in probability of survival, this is equivalent to
0.95.4 The probability that a democracy with the value zero on the corruption index last
longer than an inconsistent regime with the same value is high. The effect of corruption
4The interpretation in this case is similar to the interpretation of odds ratios. Hence, the survival
ratio can be interpreted as the odds that the time to an event (regime change) is longer than in the point
of reference.
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in inconsistent regimes is given by the estimate of corruption in the interaction model
since corruption is a constitutive term when the conditional variable is zero (inconsistent
regimes, the reference category). Corruption does not significantly affect the survival
ratio of inconsistent regimes.
The constitutive terms and the interaction term tells us two things: (1) the estimate
of each constitutive term when the conditional variable is zero, and (2) the effect of the
constitutive term on the dependent variable (gradient of the slope) dependent on the
values on the conditioning variable (Brambor, 2005, p.73-74). For the interpretation of
the conditional effect between political regimes and corruption, the estimates must be
interpreted as a combined effect. We already know that democracies with the lowest
level of corruption have a high probability of survival. The survival ratio estimate for
the interaction term between democracy and corruption, 0.7, indicates that for each
subsequent change in corruption the effect of democracy on the survival ratio is decreasing.
A survival ratio of 0.7 is equivalent to a 43 % reduction in the survival ratio, meaning that
democracies have a higher probability of survival the lower the score on the corruption
index. This is consistent with the expectation of hypothesis 3; low levels of corruption
makes democracies more likely to survive, ceteris paribus.
A visualization of the interaction term in the second model of Table 5.2 is presented
in Figure 5.1. The points represent the survival ratio estimate for democracies with
that particular value on the corruption index, ceteris paribus.5 The 95 % confidence
intervals are represented by the vertical lines through each point on the scale. While the
confidence intervals for each level on the corruption index overlap, there is a clear negative
trend between the surival ratio estimate and higher levels of corruption in democracies
(compared to inconsistent regimes). Due to the uncertainty of each estimated surival
ratio, it is not possible to distinguish significantly between each particular score on the
corruption index.
Hypothesis 4 suggest the opposite effect of corruption in autocracies, but this effect
is not supported empirically by any of the models. Hypothesis 4 is not supported; the
survival ratio of autocratic regimes is not influenced by the level of corruption. Figure
A.1 in Appendix A plots the survival ratio of autocratic regimes following the same
logic as Figure 5.1. The confidence intervals for autocracies overlap 1 for every level of
corruption. The estimates are as well close to one. Corruption does not, according to
any of the model, increase the survival ratio of autocratic regimes.
The third model is a frailty model that account for unobserved heterogeneity (differ-
ences between political regimes that are not observed through the covariates) (Jenkins,
5The constitutive term for democracy in model “MIRPS(interaction)” is the estimated survival ratio
for democracies when corruption is zero. The results in Figure 5.1 are estimated by changing the zero
to represent each integer value on the corruption index.



























Figure 5.1: The survival ratio of democracy conditioned on levels of corruption from
“MIRPS(interaction)” in Table 5.2, 1984-2008. Vertical lines represents the 95 % confi-
dence intervals.
2005, p.81). The frailty term in the model is specified as countries, and is therefore sim-
ilar to a random effects model that account for unobserved differences among countries
(some are more at risk than others). The direction and scope of the interaction effect is
similar to reported results in “MIRPS(interaction)”.
The survival ratio of democracies decreases as corruption increases. Those democra-
cies that have the lowest level of corruption are also those with the highest survival ratios.
Examples include the Nordic countries which for longer periods are coded with a score of
0 on the corruption index. Canada, Belgium, France, Luxembourg and the Netherlands
are other examples of European democracies that have had the lowest level of corruption
during the period. More importantly, none of the democracies with zero on the corruption
index have experienced a regime change during the period. In comparison, democracies
with high levels of corruption (above five) include among others Bangladesh, Indonesia,
Lebanon Niger, Russia, Ukraine and Venezuela. These countries have experienced one or
several regime changes during the period. The democracies with high levels of corruption
highlight the fact that corrupt practices from former political institutions are not curbed
instantaneously. This is a potential problem for countries transitioning from autocracies
or inconsistent regimes to democracies. If corruption is not curbed in democracies, the
prospect of regime duration is less likely. While the democracies with low levels of cor-
ruption are well-established western democracies, the ones with high levels of corruption
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are newly established democracies with a past history of instability.
Hypothesis 2 state that there is an interaction effect between corruption and political
regimes that explains the duration of political regimes. In addition to the interpretation
of each interaction effects, the log-likelihood and AIC values of Table 5.2 are suitable
for comparing the performance of nested models.6 The LR-test between “MIRPS” and
“MIRPS(interaction)” is not significant (p-value: 0.2). This means that it is not possible
to state with certainty that the interaction model fits the data better than the first
model of Table 5.2. The same test between “MIRPS” and “MIRPS(Frailty)” is neither
significant (p-value: 0.2)). The frailty model fits the data best of the three models
presented in Table 5.2. The AIC values suggest that the frailty model is the best fit, but
note that the difference in log-likelihood and AIC between the models are marginal and
not significant. Democracies are significantly more stable at low values of corruption.
This effect is decreasing for each consecutive increase in corruption.
To further assess the performance of the models presented in Table 5.2 I test the pro-
portional hazard assumption and plot the influential observations in Appendix B. The
core assumption underlying the statistical models is the proportionality of the hazard/sur-
vival ratio. Simply put, the Cox models estimate the survival ratio as a “fixed proportion
across time” (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 2005, p.48). This enables the estimation of
parameters that links absolute changes in the covariates to the proportional effect on
the duration of political regimes (Jenkins, 2005, p.30). If this assumption does not hold
among the survival rates of the units in the data, the effects of the covariates may be time
dependent Golub (2008, p.543). This means that the duration of time in itself influences
the hazard ratios of political regimes. In other words, there are unexplained factor that
influences the survival of political regimes that are not assessed by the model (since ruled
out by assumption). Table B.1 present the statistical test of the proportional hazard
assumption of “MIRPS(interaction)” in Table 5.2, and the interaction models presented
in the robustness evaluation of the main results in the next section. The proportional
hazard assumption is not breached in the main interaction model (“MIRPS(interaction)
in Table 5.2). Of the models presented in the next section, the proportional hazard as-
sumption does not hold when using the “Durable” operationalization of political regimes.
Since this model is included to assess the robustness of the main results, I do not address
the issue any further.
Figure B.1 plots the influential observation on the democracy and autocracy covariate
from model “MIRPS(interaction)”7 in Table 5.2. The y-axis on these two plots show how
6The log-likelihood and the AIC are used to assess how the models fit to the data. Based on the
difference in log-likelihood I assess the models fit by a standard likelihood ratio test (LR-test). This test
uses the -2 times the difference in log-likelihood distributed as a chi-square statistic between two nested
models Box-Steffensmeier and Jones (2005, p.44).
7There are not influential observations on any of the other covariates in the model (see Figure B.2)
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the estimate for democracies and autocracies changes given that the particular observation
is removed. The change in change in the estimates are scaled in units of standard errors,
and a score above 0.1 are usually the threshold for influential observations (Stevenson,
2012, p.30). Some observations are above this threshold; removing Argentina 1989, Brazil
1989, Greece 1986, Madagascar 1998, and Nicaragua 1995 would decrease the estimated
survival ratio of democracies. On the other side of the scale, removing Kenya 2008
increases the survival ratio estimate. In the estimate for autocracy, most observation are
below or close to the 0.1 threshold (see Figure B.1 for a complete overview).
The next section evaluate the robustness of the main results. I apply the same model
using different operationalizations of political regimes. Since the duration of political
regimes depends on the definition used, I find it valuable to asses similar operationaliza-
tions in order to evaluate the sensitivity of the resutls.
5.3 Robustness: SIP, Persist and Durable
I evaluate the robustness of the finding in two steps: (1) test the models using similar,
but different operationalizations of political regimes, and (2) run the analyses from Table
5.2 after lagging the corruption index by one year in order to evaluate issues related to
endogeneity.
As seen from Table 5.3, the alternative operationalizations, both with and without
the interaction terms, finds similar results as reported in Table 5.2. Operationalizing the
political regimes according to thresholds on the SIP-index, as any change in the Polity IV
sub indicators, or as a minimum of three point change on the Polity-index, find similar
trend as the main models. The interaction term between corruption and democracy is
not significant in the “Durable(interaction)” model in Table 5.3. However, the actual
significance of the interaction terms and constitutive terms are not the main inquiry.
Since interaction terms rely on the covariance of all terms included in the interaction
the interaction effect can be significant over some levels of the conditioning variable even
though the terms are insignificant (Brambor, 2005, p.73-74). The “Durable(interaction)”
model stand in close resemblance to the results presented in Table 5.2. The main difference
between the“MIRPS”in Table 5.2 and“Durable” in Table 5.3 operationalization of regime
duration is the results concerning the duration of autocratic regimes. In the former, the
duration of autocratic regimes are not distinguishable from inconsistent regimes while
autocratic regimes are less stable in the latter. It is sufficient, however, in this case to
note that the same trend as established in the main results remain relatively unchanged
across operationalizations of political regimes, regime changes and duration spells.
An additional problem that potentially challenges the results is endogeneity. In other
words, there is a degree of uncertainty concerning the direction the causal relationship
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between the independent variables and the dependent variables. Here, this uncertainty is
first and foremost linked to the relationship between corruption, political regimes and the
duration of political regimes. Treisman (2007, p.230-231) find that there is a relationship
between political institutions and corruption where democracies tend to have lower levels
of corruption. This, however, is a matter of multicollinearity in my analyses, but what
is more problematic is the fact that changes in corruption levels might be explained by
the duration of political regimes. In fact there are some empirical evidence that well
established democracies have lower corruption than newly established; Treisman (2007,
p.230-231) find that there is significantly less corruption in democracies, but that this
effect is not significant when excluding democracies established before 1950 from the
sample. Also, which my results show, democracies with low levels of corruption are
regimes that have been in existence for longer periods before entering the dataset in
1984, and remain in existence the entire time period. Questions linked to the direction of
causality in these particular cases are a natural concern. It is possible that the low levels
of corruption are results of long duration spans. In other words, it might be the case that
democracies curb corruption over time.
I address the potential problem by lagging the corruption index with one year by
following the logic of Box-Steffensmeier, Brady and Collier (2008, p.19-20) in considering
“values of variables that occur earlier in time to be ‘predetermined’–not quite exogenous
but not endogenous either”. The main trends remain unchanged (the results are reported
in Table A.3). The results are similar to the main results in Table 5.2, but the interaction
effect between corruption and democracy is weaker in the models with lagged corruption
index Table. Note that this “test” is only preliminary. Lagging the corruption index does
not rule out endogeneity, but indicate whether the issue is of relevance. Further testing
of this issue is beyond the scope of this thesis.
5.4 Summary of results
The main results indicate that the survival estimate of democracies is decreasing when
corruption is increasing within the sample of countries and time period. The surival of
autocracies are not affected by the level of corruption, nor are autocracies more stable
than inconsistent regimes in this particular period. This finding contrasts the main trend
of the 20th century. Gates et al. (2006, p.901) find that autocracies are expected to
endure longer than inconsistent regimes (see “Model 2 1900-2000” in Table ??). The
diminishing prospect of regime endurance within the period for autocracies is a robust
finding across model specifications. All results point in that direction. The interaction
effect between corruption and democracy seem to some degree to be consistent across
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alternative operationalizations. The actual estimate differs, but the overall trend in the
results point in the same direction.
Compared to the preliminary analyses in the previous chapter (Table 4.2), linking
corruption to an increase in the probability of attempted and successfull coups, govern-
ment crises, revolution attempts and demonstrations, the increase in political stability
and civil unrest seems to affect democracies the most. The fact that corrupiton does not
affect the stability of autocratic regimes while at the same time increase the probability
of event of political instability and civil unrest suggest that the strategies available for
the leadership and winning coalition in autocracies are better adapt at preventing such
events from leading to a change in the political regime.
The operationalization of political regimes and regime changes does not alter the
results greatly. The main trend is consistent even though the magnitude and influence of
corruption varies according to operationalizations. When using the three point change in
the polity scale as operationalization of regime change the interaction between corruption
and democracies are no longer significant. However, the main trend is the same as
presented in Table 5.2: democracies are relatively more stable at low levels of corruption,
and each concecutive increase in corruption decreases the survival ratio. The effect is
overall weaker in this model and the uncertainty linked to the interaction effect is larger.
Due to a lack of corruption data with compatible time frames, I am not able to
assess the robustness of the results using alternative measures of corruption. I rest on
the findings of others (e.g. Treisman (2007, p.215-221)) that corruption indices usually
overlap and correlate highly indicating that the general trends in corruption are captured
by the different indices. However, this is obviously a problem for the validity of the main
results in addition to the general criticism of corruption data; lack of consistency in many
indices including the one used in this thesis, and limited insight into the coding of the
cross-national corruption data are issues to keep in mind when interpreting the results
Treisman (2007, p.215-221).
Even though the alternative regime measurements support the main trends presented
in Table 5.2, there are still a limited amount of countries and years included in the sample
due to lack of coverage on the corruption index. This limits the ability to generalize the
main results. Therefore, the results should be treated in a probabilistic sense only.











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In this thesis I have hypothesized that the effect of corruption is conditional upon regime
type, and that corruption decreases the duration of democracies and increases the dura-
tion of autocratic regimes. The survival analyses suggest that corruption decreases the
survival ratio of democratic regimes. The effect of corruption, conditioned on political
regimes, is only relevant and significant for democratic regimes. The results derived from
the main models therefore confirms Hypothesis 2 and 3. The effect of corruption depends
on the formal properties of a political regime, and corruption decreases the survival ratio
of democracies.
I find no support of Hypothesis 4; the duration of autocracies are not affected by the
level of corruption, nor are autocracies more stable than inconsistent regimes during the
period 1984-2008. In relation to the replication framework of Gates et al. (2006), the
main findings are altered when looking at the time-period 1984-2008; autocratic regimes
are not more stable than inconsistent regimes within the period. From 1984 to 2008
democracies are substantially more durable than inconsistent regimes while autocracies
are not.
In the preliminary analyses in Section 4.2 I linked corruption to an increase in the
probability of coup attempts, government crisis, riots, revolution attempts and demon-
strations. Except for riots, corruption increases the probability of each event consistent
with the expectation presented in Hypothesis 1. Compared to the main analyses, events
causing political instability and civil unrest are not necessarily translated into regime
instability. Corruption increases political instability and civil unrest unconditionally, but
corruption only influences the stability of political regimes in interaction with democracy.
The hypotheses were derived based on the insights of the selectorate theory (Bueno
de Mesquita et al., 2003). More precisely, the allocation of resources and the welfare of
societal groups within an initial political regime were used in order to analyze the role and
effect of corruption. Corruption is a private goods which allocates wealth in the hands
of the winning coalition and the leadership. The selectorate and the disenfranchised are
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not influenced by private goods, and naturally prefer political regimes allocating public
goods rather than private. Corruption as a strategy of political survival increases the
level of private goods spending which simultaneously decreases the level of public goods.
The allocation of goods and the preferences of societal groups have been used to explain
the future prospects of political regimes. If the distribution of resources are incompatible
with the preferences of the groups with de jure political power, we can expect political
instability and civil unrest and in turn institutional instability.
The trend in the main analysis are robust to alternative operationalizations of po-
litical regimes as shown in Table 5.3. Overall, my findings display similar trends across
operationalizations of political regimes. While many of the indicators are shared by
the composite measurements of political regimes, the definition of a change in political
regimes varies. Therefore, the actual duration of political regimes vary across the mea-
surements. The fact that a somewhat similar trend is shown across operationalizations
favors the robustness of my results. Even though the estimates differ, the trend is con-
sistent. Democracies are more stable than inconsistent regimes, and in interaction with
corruption the survival ratio estimate is decreasing for each consecutive level of corrup-
tion.
Combined with the many fallacies of available corruption data, also true for the data
used here (Treisman, 2007, p.220-221), any generalizations of the main findings are diffi-
cult. Also, theoretically, corruption is a subject hard to investigate due to the scope of
the concept (i.e. the wide range of sub indicators). The selectorate theory offers an ex-
planation of the consequences of corruption for regime duration, but more can be done in
order to better understand the consequences of corruption for the duration of particular
institutions and aggregated measures of political regimes.
The lack of consistent time series data is the main challenge for any study analyzing
the determinant and effects of corruption. The perception and expert coded corruption
indices that are most commonly used in cross-country analysis of both determinant and
effects are questionable, poorly documented and not consistent over time. In sum, they
have a low degree of reliability and measurement validity. Improving the data collection
and documentation of indices already being used stand as a challenge that needs to be
addressed. Alternatively, one could find better proxies by looking at the structural im-
plications of the existing body of research. Data material such as minister extensions of
cabinet size (Arriola, 2009, p.1349-1350) used as a measurement of patronage politics,
are creative solutions that increase our insight into the consequences of corruption. The
available corruption-indices (especially the ICRG corruption-index) use a wide range of
indicators under the term corruption which might lead to confusion and misunderstand-
ings of the actual casual mechanisms.
Overall, the research question asked whether corruption influences the duration of
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political regimes. The results presented in this thesis suggest that corruption decreases
the survival ratio of democracies. The results also indicate that the survival ratio of
autocratic regimes are unaffected by the degree of corruption.
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Table A.1 below is a list of all countries included in the ICRG corruption index.
ICRG country list
Albania Algeria Angola Argentina
Armenia Australia Austria Azerbaijan
Bahamas Bahrain Bangladesh Belarus
Belgium Bolivia Botswana Brazil
Brunei Bulgaria Burkina Faso Cameroon
Canada Chile China Colombia
Congo Congo, DR Costa Rica Cote d’Ivoire
Croatia Cuba Cyprus Czech Republic
Czechoslovakia Denmark Dominican Republic East Germany
Ecuador Egypt El Salvador Estonia
Ethiopia Finland France Gabon
Gambia Germany Ghana Greece
Guatemala Guinea Guinea-Bissau Guyana
Haiti Honduras Hong Kong Hungary
Iceland India Indonesia Iran
Iraq Ireland Israel Italy
Jamaica Japan Jordan Kazakhstan
Kenya Korea, DPR Kuwait Latvia
Lebanon Liberia Libya Lithuania
Luxembourg Madagascar Malawi Malaysia
Mali Malta Mexico Moldova
Mongolia Morocco Mozambique Myanmar
Namibia Netherlands New Caledonia New Zealand
Nicaragua Niger Nigeria Norway
Oman Pakistan Panama Papua New Guinea
Paraguay Peru Philippines Poland
Portugal Qatar Romania Russia
Saudi Arabia Senegal Serbia Serbia & Montenegro
Sierra Leone Singapore Slovakia Slovenia
Somalia South Africa South Korea Spain
Sri Lanka Sudan Suriname Sweden
Switzerland Syria Taiwan Tanzania
Thailand Togo Trinidad & Tobago Tunisia
Turkey United Arab Emirates Uganda Ukraine
United Kingdom United States Uruguay USSR
Venezuela Vietnam West Germany Yemen
Zambia Zimbabwe
Notes: countries in bold characters have experienced at least one regime change, 1984-2008
Table A.1: List of countries used in the main analyses, 1984-2008
Unlike the main results, the preliminary results does not interact corruption and
regime type. Table A.2 supplements Table 4.3 in Section 4.2 by interacting corruption
81
82 APPENDIX A. ADDITIONAL OUTPUT
and regime type.
Table A.2: Corruption and coups, government crisis, riots, revolutions and demonstra-
tions, 1984-2008
Coups Gov.Crisis Riots Revolutions Demonstrations
Autocracy 0.691 0.138* 0.38 1.736 0.256**
(15.829,0.03) (1.049,0.018) (1.315,0.11) (6.842,0.44) (0.754,0.087)
Democracy 0.497 1.559 0.774 0.952 0.485**
(7.546,0.033) (4.591,0.529) (1.84,0.326) (2.742,0.331) (0.973,0.241)
Corruption 1.47 1.097 0.94 1.196 0.95
(2.44,0.886) (1.442,0.834) (1.165,0.759) (1.531,0.934) (1.133,0.797)
log(Duration years) 0.671*** 0.842* 0.859** 0.959 0.826***
(0.9,0.5) (1.006,0.704) (0.998,0.739) (1.13,0.813) (0.937,0.729)
log(GDP per capita, t-1) 0.886 1.08 0.827*** 0.651*** 1.092
(1.28,0.613) (1.283,0.909) (0.954,0.718) (0.758,0.559) (1.232,0.968)
GDP Growth(t-1) 0.934** 0.939*** 0.975** 0.977* 0.979**
(0.985,0.886) (0.965,0.914) (0.998,0.953) (1.002,0.954) (0.999,0.96)
Natural Resources 0.6 0.542 0.861 1.136 0.461***
(2.661,0.135) (1.161,0.253) (1.454,0.509) (1.906,0.677) (0.756,0.281)
NeighboorSIP 0.604 1.314 0.688 0.815 1.456*
(2.382,0.153) (2.355,0.733) (1.145,0.413) (1.428,0.466) (2.207,0.961)
Autoc*Corr 1.07 1.429 1.245 0.796 1.383**
(2.358,0.486) (2.41,0.847) (1.755,0.884) (1.162,0.545) (1.86,1.028)
Democ*Corr 1.221 1.146 1.205 1.242 1.404***
(2.45,0.608) (1.538,0.853) (1.535,0.946) (1.646,0.937) (1.708,1.155)
log-likelihood -189.67 -813.91 -976.5 -855.57 -1350.55
AIC 401.34 1649.82 1975 1733.14 2723.1
Notes: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Estimates are reported in odds ratioes (exp(coef)).
99 percent confidence intervals in parentheses.
Figure A.1 is a visualization of the main interaction results between autocracies and
the level of corruption presented in the main results.
Table A.3 is included as an attempt to adress the issue of endogeneity by lagging the




























Figure A.1: The survival ratio of autocracy conditioned on levels of corruption, 1984-2008.
Point estiamates for each integer value on the corruption-index with 95 % confidence
intervals (vertical grey lines) based on model “MIRPS(interaction)” in Table 5.2. The
horisontal dashed line represent a surival ratio of 1 (no difference in survival)
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Table A.3: Models with lagged corruption index, 1984-2008
MIRPS MIRPS(interaction) MIRPS(Frailty)
Autocracy 0.829 1.162 1.193
(0.583,1.179) (0.346,3.906) (0.369,3.858)
Democracy 6.429*** 16.975*** 17.536***
(3.907,10.581) (5.353,53.828) (4.592,66.967)
Corruption (t-1) 1.023 1.104 1.112
(0.887,1.179) (0.921,1.323) (0.921,1.342)
log(GDP per capita, t-1) 1.165* 1.173* 1.189*
(0.974,1.392) (0.978,1.407) (0.999,1.417)
GDP Growth(t-1) 1.05*** 1.052*** 1.051***
(1.022,1.08) (1.023,1.081) (1.028,1.075)
Resources 0.912 0.903 0.892
(0.494,1.684) (0.489,1.666) (0.481,1.651)






log-likelihood null -876.64 -876.64 -876.64
log-likelihood -812.8 -811.51 -804.28
AIC 1639.61 1641.01 1638.65
N 2725 2725 2725
Number of events 196 196 196
Notes: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Estimates are reported in survival ratioes.
Standard errors are clustered on country. 99 percent confidence intervals in parentheses.
Appendix B
Diagnostics
I follow the tests presented in Stevenson (2012, p.22-23,29) when evaluating the cor-
relation between Schoenfeld residuals and time. The Schoenfeld residuals evaluate the
proportional hazard assumption by taking the “observed minus the expected values of the
covariates at each failure time” Box-Steffensmeier and Jones (2005, p.121). If the effect of
the covariates on the survival ratio of political regimes dependent on the duration of time
itself, the assumption of proportional hazard would underestimate the effect of the covari-
ate up until that point, and overestimate for the subsequent duration (Box-Steffensmeier
and Jones, 2005, p.131-132). Table B.1 report statistical test (chi-square) of the pro-
portional hazard assumption for the main interaction models (Model 2 and 3 in Table
5.2), and indicate that the assumption is not breached for any of the main explanatory
variables nor the models at large (i.e. “Global” is not significant. The rho from Table B.1
is defined by Stevenson (2012, p.29) as “the Pearson product-moment correlation between
the scaled Schoenfeld residuals and time”, where the hypothesis on no correlation is tested
based on chi-squared test statistics. The proportional hazard assumption does not hold
in model “Durable(interaction)” as several of the covariates report significant rho values.
In addition, the global test is significant.
Figure B.1 and B.2 combined report how the observations influence the coefficient
for every covariate in “MIRPS(interaction)” in Table 5.2. Labels are added to the the
plots in Figure B.1 since some of the observations exceeds a 0.1 change scaled in units of
standard errors. A score above 0.1 are usually the threshold for influencial observations
(Stevenson, 2012, p.30).
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Figure B.1: Influencial observations autocracies and democracies, 1984-2008. The change
in coefficient scaled in units of standard errors (y-axis) when removing each observation
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Figure B.2: Influencial observations, 1984-2008. The change in coefficient scaled in
units of standard errors (y-axis) when removing each observation (x-axis) from model
“MIRPS(interaction)” in Table 5.2

























































































































































































































































































































































All relevant R-files used to create the main models, tables and figures in this thesis are
available upon request (contact: jonas.kjarvik@gmail.com).
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90 APPENDIX C. SYNTAX
